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Abstract
How do international observers decide whether to criticize or condone electoral
fraud in a country? We argue that this decision depends on the identity of the victims
of electoral fraud. A monitoring organization is more likely to overlook fraud commit-
ted against groups that are deemed dangerous by its sponsor. Based on this insight,
we hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era election monitors are more tolerant of
fraud against Islamic challengers, especially when Islamic movements are perceived as
a threat to political stability. In support of our hypothesis, we find that outside moni-
tors are more likely to endorse an election in countries with an Islamic opposition party
and an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign. Furthermore, we find that the effect is
driven by Western monitoring organizations and becomes stronger after the September
11 attacks. Our findings provide a simple yet powerful insight: the calculus of outside
observers depends not only on who they wish to see in power, but also who they want
to keep from power.
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Democracy promotion has become one of the key elements of Western foreign policy since the
Cold War ended, but Western states have not consistently pushed autocratic governments
towards liberalization. This variation in Western pressure had important consequences for
the spread of democracy: where consistent pressure was applied the chances of democrati-
zation were greatest and where democracy promotion was sidelined by other concerns the
chances of democratization were much lower.1
So, how do outside actors, especially those from the West, decide between promoting
democracy and condoning authoritarianism in a country? Scholars have posited that West-
ern states face a trade-off between their desire to promote democracy and their own national
interests.2 Previous research has shown that in economically and politically important coun-
tries the West has been more willing to overlook repression.3 Likewise, incumbents who have
made preliminary moves toward democracy and those who have maintained good relations
with the West have felt less pressure to liberalize.4 In other words, the West promotes
democracy less consistently when the state in question is important and the incumbent is
someone the West wants to keep in power.
In this paper we bring opposition parties into the study of democracy promotion. We
argue that the calculus of outside actors depends not on their absolute bias towards the
incumbent regime, but their relative bias toward the incumbent regime and its challengers.5
That is, the decision to promote political liberalization depends on who is likely to replace
the incumbent. If the most likely challenger to replace the incumbent harbours suspicious
attitudes toward democracy and international cooperation, then outsiders will be more likely
to turn a blind eye to the incumbent’s electoral manipulation. We propose that in the post-
Cold War period the most “dangerous” challengers from the West’s perspective have been
Islamic political parties, by which we mean parties seeking to increase the role of Islam
1Levitsky and Way 2005
2e.g., Kelley 2009
3Levitsky and Way 2005
4Kelley 2009
5See also Bubeck and Marinov 2017.
1
in political life.6 Islamic parties often contest elections in the geostrategically important
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and have proved electorally viable in several
countries, including Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia.7 The Islamic parties’ hawkish views on
Israel and the USA, combined with doubts about these parties’ commitment to democracy
have made them threatening to outsiders.8 A crucial factor exacerbating this problem is
Islamist terrorist attacks. In countries targeted by violent Islamist groups both domestic and
international actors will have greater doubts about Islamic parties’ willingness and ability
to restrain radicals. Therefore, we expect that international observers will tolerate electoral
manipulation more when facing the combination of an Islamic opposition party and an
ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign.9
As illustration consider the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections in Tanzania. The two
elections are similar in that the main opposition party was the Civic Union Front (CUF),
which primarily represents Muslims and faces accusations by the incumbent party Chaca
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) of religious extremism.10 In both elections the ruling party won
and the CUF claimed fraud.11 Moreover, respected international monitors also considered
both elections as flawed.12 Yet, whereas none of the international monitors endorsed the
1995 election, in 2000 two of the four monitors announced that they considered election
quality acceptable. The key difference, we argue, was the 1998 Al-Qaeda attacks against
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed more than 200 people and brought Al-
Qaeda to the attention of the US government. The attacks highlighted the threat of religious
fundamentalism in Africa and led to counter terrorism cooperation between Tanzania and the
6Most scholars of Islam and politics distinguish between “Islamic” and “Islamist” actors. We follow
convention using the broader term “Islamic” to refer to the set of parties in our analysis (which includes
moderates and radicals) and “Islamist” to refer to individuals and movements, including terrorists, seeking
to implement Islamic government.
7Cammett and Luong 2014, 188
8Jamal 2012
9We assume that incumbents’ engage in fraud, following Bubeck and Marinov 2017, 537.
10Brents and Mshigeni 2004, 67
11Ibid., 61
12See the election monitoring dataset (DIEM) introduced in Kelley 2012.
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US.13 In short, by 2000 Tanzania was a country where an Islamic opposition party contested
elections and Islamist terrorists were active. This paper explores whether in other countries
under similar circumstances international election monitors display an anti-Islamic bias in
their evaluations.
We test this hypothesis in the context of election monitoring, a core component of democ-
racy promotion. We find that, conditional on the extent of electoral irregularities, interna-
tional monitors are more likely to endorse an outcome if the incumbent regime faces both
an Islamic challenger and an ongoing Islamist terror campaign. If a country is not suffering
from any terrorism, or existing terrorist groups are non-Islamist, then we do not observe
any bias against Islamic opposition parties. We further present evidence that this pattern of
behavior is displayed only by Western monitors and is absent for non-Western monitoring
organizations. Lastly, we show that the bias existed prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks,
but becomes stronger after 9/11, when the War on Terror began and stopping radical Islam
became a priority for the West. In sum, our findings support the idea that Islamist terrorism
makes Islamic parties suspect in the eyes of Western observers and leads them to overlook
electoral fraud committed against Islamic challengers.
The paper contributes to the literature on foreign interventions in domestic affairs and
the literature on election observer bias. Domestic sovereignty is a frequently violated norm.
For instance, during the Cold War the US and the Soviet Union used their economic and
military power to destabilize each other’s allies and prop up their own.14 After the Cold
War direct military interventions became less common and elections have become the le-
gitimate method of changing governments. In this context foreign powers could help their
allies remain in power by giving funding to their favored candidate, making promises of aid
conditional on their ally’s victory, or ignoring electoral abuses committed by their ally.15
We contribute to this important literature by examining how violent groups can influence
13Haynes 2005, 1326,1331 and Ploch 2010, 57
14Gaddis 2006
15Robinson 1996; Corstange and Marinov 2012; Bubeck and Marinov 2017
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outsiders’ perceptions of political candidates (e.g. Islamic opposition parties) and impact
international actors’ incentives to endorse or reject fraudulent elections.
With regard to the literature on election observer bias, we build on Kelley’s work.16 Like
Kelley, we argue that whether international monitors endorse an election or not does not
solely depend on its quality, but also on the interests of their member states, donors17, or
other tangential organizational norms.18 We expand Kelley’s work by looking at a previously
ignored election-specific factor in this literature – i.e., the type of electoral challenger.19
Election Monitor Bias, Islamic Opposition and Islamist
Terrorism
We first theorize which factors can influence an election monitor’s decision to endorse or
reject an election outcome. We then argue that in the post-Cold War era distrust toward
Islamic parties has made election monitors more likely to endorse fraudulent elections in
which Islamic opposition parties challenge the incumbent. Lastly, we argue that the threat
perception of Islamic parties is heightened by domestic and international Islamist terrorism.
The Trade-Off Between Stability and Democracy Promotion
The basic premise of our argument is that election quality is not the only factor international
monitors take into consideration when deciding whether to endorse or oppose an election
outcome. Election monitors also consider the interests of member states or major donors.20
In particular, we argue that election monitors face a trade-off between democracy promotion
and international stability in the post Cold War period. Whereas stable countries present
16Kelley 2009
17By “donors” we refer to (state and non-state) actors that may have influence over a monitoring orga-
nization due to their control over funding or personnel management. For examples of donor pressure on
election monitors in past elections, see Kew 1999 and McIntire and Gettleman 2009.
18Kelley 2009
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
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more opportunities for cooperation, democratization brings new groups into politics and
can be turbulent.21 Although fears of communist takeovers have disappeared with the end
of the Cold War, decision-makers continue to recognize the tension between stability and
democratization,22 as negative evaluations may destabilize a regime in the aftermath of
elections.2324
A monitor’s preference for stability depends essentially on it’s bias toward the incumbent
relative to alternatives. The choice between endorsing a problematic election and rejecting it
is equivalent to a choice between continuing relations with the incumbent versus supporting
an alternative and establishing a new relationship. So, the better the relations with the
incumbent, the more concerned a monitor’s key donors might be about upsetting political
and economic relations, and the more likely the monitor is to endorse an election.25 However,
outsiders’ fondness for the incumbent is not the only relevant factor here. Their views toward
the challengers also matter.26 If challengers include parties with unfriendly ideologies and
militant wings, combined with a significant chance of gaining power, then the importance of
maintaining stability increases. A monitor may support an authoritarian regime not because
the incumbent provides any real benefits, but because destabilizing him/her may bring to
power an even worse actor – from the perspective of key members or donors.27 In short, the
calculus of monitors inevitably includes who the opposition parties are and whether they
have a significant chance of gaining power through elections.
21Huntington 1968
22Carothers 1997
23Hyde and Marinov 2014; Bush and Prather 2017a
24Non-democracies are selective about which outside groups to allow into the country and non-
governmental organizations adapt their policies to avoid expulsion. Bush 2015 In the robustness section
we explicitly address this selection issue.
25Kelley 2009
26Bubeck and Marinov 2017
27The following quote by President Kennedy during the Cold War illustrates this: “There are three
possibilities in descending order of preference: a democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or
a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure we
can avoid the third.” Smith 2012, 226
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Islamic Parties’ Political Goals and Credibility Problem
In the post-Cold War era many scholars see Islamic opposition parties as a threat to political
stability because they are popular and espouse potentially disruptive political goals. There
are several explanations on why Islamic movements are better than other groups at gaining
popularity.2829 First, Islamic parties’ strong emphasis on honesty and fairness appeals es-
pecially to people who live in poor and often corrupt societies.30 Secondly, Islamic political
parties are usually related to grassroots organizations that provide local public goods, which
in turn lend them a good reputation.31 Thirdly, Islamic parties have often been allowed to
exist while other forms of non-state groups were repressed.32 Hence, their ideological ap-
peal, grassroots service, and reputation for good governance make Islamic parties electorally
viable and dangerous to unpopular incumbents.
In addition to their popularity, Islamic parties’ domestic and foreign policy goals also raise
concerns. In foreign policy, potential problems are that most Islamic parties have mentioned
jihad in their party platforms and opposed Israel, a close ally of the West and the US in
particular.33 Coupled with Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis,34 these party
platforms have raised the suspicion that if Islamic parties come to power they may pursue
aggressive policies toward the West and its allies, much like post-revolution Iran has done.35
In domestic politics, some have suspected that Islamic parties pretend to be democratic
and compete in elections until they achieve the power to use more forceful methods.3637 If
28Cammett and Luong 2014
29Even if Islamic parties have not been very strong in most elections they participated in, the general view
is that they are a formidable electoral force. Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Hamid 2011
30Wickham 2002
31Masoud 2013
32Brumberg 2002
33Gerges 1999; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010
34Huntington 1996
35Gerges 1999; Masoud 2008
36Masoud 2008
37Although Islamic parties may try to signal their commitment to democracy and moderate policies,
credibility problems limit their ability to convince the skeptics. Verbal commitments to pluralism can be
dismissed as cheap talk and divisions between moderate and hardliner factions make it difficult for Islamic
parties to give a unified message of moderation. Kalyvas 2000
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true, this could have severe negative consequences for international actors, especially in the
MENA region, which is geostrategically important for the West.
This does not mean that Islamic political parties are seen as a dire threat to democracy
at all times and places. Our main point is that there has been mistrust toward Islamic
movements that is difficult to dispel. Whether this mistrust creates bias in election monitors’
evaluations is influenced by other contextual factors, most importantly, Islamist terrorism.
Islamist Terrorism and Heightened Threat Perception
We expect Islamic parties’ credibility problem and outsiders’ bias toward them to be more
severe in countries where Islamist terrorist groups operate. Islamist terrorism can have this
effect by magnifying the perceived threat of Islamic parties’ electoral participation.
Firstly, terrorism discredits moderates, which is one of the primary goals of violent ex-
tremists and they are more likely to succeed when outsiders do not have much trust toward
the moderates to begin with.38 Note that these effects do not require the terrorist group
to be very large or the violent campaign to be sustained for long. Even a small group of
terrorists can have a considerable impact, because cognitive mechanisms, such as availability
bias, lead people to overreact to threats.39
Moreover, incumbents have often used Islamist terrorist attacks as an opportunity to
repress and weaken a powerful challenger under the guise of counter-terrorism.40 In Tanzania,
following the controversial 2000 election mentioned in the introduction, government security
forces used force to suppress demonstrations against electoral fraud resulting in at least
30 people killed and hundreds injured. Tanzanian officials claimed that their response was
justified, because “protests had been encouraged by Islamist fundamentalists with ties to
Osama bin Laden ... [and they were] an attempted coup d’etat”, but a Human Rights Watch
report contradicts this account.41 Outside observers may be receptive to such government
38Kydd and Walter 2002
39Mueller 2006; Sunstein and Zeckhauser 2011
40Wegner 2011
41Human Rights Watch 2002, 42
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claims, because Islamic opposition parties often have ties to violent Islamist groups42 and
outsiders lack the intelligence capabilities and mandate to conduct independent investigations
in these countries.
In short, Islamic opposition parties, especially in combination with Islamist terrorism,
may be perceived by the West to present a greater threat to stability than most other
challengers. As foreign governments care more about keeping Islamists out of power, they
can also push election monitors to be more tolerant to incumbents who electorally suppress
Islamic parties. Combining these arguments leads to our main prediction: if an election
monitoring organization values stability over democratization, then it will be more toler-
ant toward fraud in elections involving an Islamic challenger and Islamist terrorism than
those without Islamic opposition or non-Islamist terror. As we argue that the West is more
likely to value stability over democratization, we expect Western monitors to be significantly
more lenient towards fraud committed against Islamic opposition parties than non-Western
observers.
So far we have discussed the role of domestic terrorism, but transnational Islamist ter-
rorism can also heighten threat perceptions. The primary example of transnational Islamist
terrorism are the 9/11 attacks, which changed the course of US foreign policy. The attacks on
9/11 demonstrated terrorists’ ability to inflict large-scale attacks in Western countries43 and
“reinforced the apprehensions of the US foreign policy establishment about all Islamists”.44
After 9/11, an Islamic party with ties to radicals is not only a threat to its own country’s
stability, but also a potential supporter to global terrorism. Given these new risks, in the
post-9/11 era we expect the relative importance of stability to increase and election mon-
itors to become more tolerant toward fraud committed against Islamic opposition parties,
especially when the country in question has an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign.
42Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Perliger 2008
43Walt 2001
44Gerges 2013, 415
8
Research Design
Data
Our unit of analysis is an organization-election between 1990 and 2004; that is an election
judged by a monitoring organization from January 1991 to December 2004. We limit our
analysis to the post-Cold War period, as geopolitical concerns of the West during the Cold
War overshadowed the stability-democracy tradeoff crucial to our argument and election
monitoring became an international norm during that time period.4546 Monitoring organi-
zations include intergovernmental (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
publish their reports within three months of an election, based on collected information from
in-country observers before, during, and after a poll. Below we distinguish between Western
and non-Western organizations based on their membership (for IGOs) or the location of their
head office (for NGOs).47
Our outcome measure denotes whether an organization endorses the election outcome or
not. This dichotomous variable, Acceptable, reflects an organization’s summary assessment.
It is a dichotomous version of the three-level Election Quality variable in the Dataset on
International Election Monitoring (DIEM).48 Acceptable takes the value of 1 only if the
monitor’s report explicitly endorses the outcome and 0 if the report was either ambiguous
about the quality of an election or deemed it unacceptable.49
Our measure of electoral irregularities is the Problems variable from the DIEM50, which
ranges from 0 (“no problems”) to 3 (“major problems”). This variable is comprehensive
in scope, including problems in the country’s legal framework, problems in the pre-election
period, and the election day itself. By including this variable we are able to estimate the
45Hyde 2011
46The results remain qualitatively similar when extending the time period to include all organization-
elections between 1984 and 1990, as shown in Appendix Table A.18.
47For the list of Western and non-Western election monitors in our dataset see Appendix Table A.2.
48Kelley 2012
49Our results are robust to using the three-level Election Quality as the dependent variable. See Appendix
Table A.5.
50Kelley 2012
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effect of Islamic opposition parties, Islamist terror, and their interaction on an organization’s
endorsement of an election, conditional on the extent of electoral problems an organization
identified. If monitors made their decision to endorse or reject an election exclusively on the
extent of electoral problems, then the coefficient estimates of all other variables should be
close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Data on Islamic opposition parties is based on a list of all Islamic parties between 1968-
2008, where an Islamic party is defined as a party that “seeks to increase the role of Islam in
political life”.51 To arrive at our Islamic Opposition Party variable, we identified all Islamic
parties out of government on Kurzman and Naqvi’s list.5253 This dichotomous variable is
coded 1 if there is an Islamic opposition party in the country and 0 otherwise.54
Our terrorism measures are based on the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism In-
cidents55, which compiles data on terrorism from around the world for the entire period we
study. Following Jones and Libicki, we distinguish between Islamist and non-Islamist orga-
nizations in this database and calculate, for each election, the number of killings committed
by Islamist and non-Islamist groups in that country in the preceding year.56 These num-
bers, Islamist Terrorism and Non-Islamist Terrorism, are our primary measures of terrorist
activity.57
Although our hypothesis is about the interaction of Islamic Opposition and Islamist
Terrorism we also control for Non-Islamist Terrorism and its interaction with Islamic Op-
position. This is necessary to ensure that our Islamist Terrorism variable does not simply
capture a country’s overall political instability.
51Kurzman and Naqvi 2010, 51
52Ibid.
53In Appendix Table A.19 we show that we get similar results using an alternative measure based on the
Database of Political Institutions.Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016
54We include observations where an Islamic opposition party was banned from or boycotted an election,
because these bans and boycotts are also often instances of election irregularities. Our results are robust to
coding those case as 0.
55RAND 2015
56Jones and Libicki 2008
57Analyses that measure terrorism based on the number of attacks in a year or the number of killings in
the preceding five years yield similar results.
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As controls we include a number of country- and election-specific variables. We include
the percentage of a country’s Muslim Population58 to capture cultural factors that may be
correlated both with the level of electoral fraud and the rise of Islamic challengers. We
control for a country’s overall level of democracy using the Polity2 variable from the Polity
IV dataset59 to isolate the effect of electoral fraud on monitors’ endorsements. We also
include indicators for First Multiparty, Transitional, Post-Conflict, and Post-Coup elections
from the DIEM.60 Kelley has shown that monitors are more likely to endorse such elections
and Islamic challengers are more likely to emerge in these settings.61 By a similar logic we
also control for the Change in Democracy in the last year.62 We include Infant Mortality
Rate63 as a measure of a country’s well-being, which may again be correlated with both fraud
and the presence of Islamic parties. We also control for Pre-Election Violence as reported
in the DIEM, which may be correlated with terrorist campaigns and electoral misconduct64.
Our Legislative Election variable65 distinguishes between different types of elections, because
those may differ in terms of opposition groups’ participation and electoral fraud.
Lastly, we include four measures of donor interest. The first is the logged value of a
country’s Oil Production, because oil is a strategically valuable commodity and its production
is correlated with both Islamic party presence and electoral fraud.66 We also use a country’s
(logged) Total Trade and Total GDP, which captures a country’s importance for global trade
and market size.67 Our fourth measure is Former Colony, which is coded 1 for former colonies
of France and the UK, 0 otherwise.68 Overall, our sample includes elections from 93 countries
and 21 organizations over 14 years. Of the 511 organization-elections an Islamic opposition
58Barro and McCleary 2003
59Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2002
60Kelley 2012
61Kelley 2009
62Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2002
63World Bank 2017
64Kelley 2012
65Ibid.
66Ross 2013
67Kelley 2009
68Appendix Tables A.11 and A.12 report additional tests regarding the incumbent’s value for international
actors.
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was present in 38 (i.e., 7%).
Statistical Model
We estimate linear regression models, which are as good as nonlinear models at estimating
marginal effects69 and, importantly, allows us to include country fixed effects to control for
time-invariant country-specific factors without sacrificing sample size.70 We estimate the
following equation:
Acceptable = β0 + β1Problems
+ β2Islamic Opposition + β3Islamist Terrorism + β4Non-Islamist Terrorism
+ β5Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition
+ β6Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition
+ Xβ + .
Our argument predicts β5 to be positive and statistically significant.
Results
Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 show the estimates for monitors’ election evaluations (pooled and
with country-fixed effects). In models 3 and 4 we separate the sample into non-Western and
Western monitors to show that the effects are driven mainly by Western monitors. In models
5 and 6 we show that the effects are stronger after the September 11 attacks. All models
include the full list of country- and election-specific controls. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-level.
69Angrist and Pischke 2008; Beck 2015
70Our results are similar if we use a pooled Logit estimator instead.
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Table 1: Impact of Islamist Terrorism on Election Monitors’ Islamic Opposition Bias
All Countries Country Non-Western Western Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Fixed-Effects Monitors Monitors Era Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Problems −0.336∗∗ −0.273∗∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.354∗∗ −0.312∗∗ −0.341∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.046) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.096 −0.179 −0.215∗∗ −0.138 −0.056 0.070
(0.083) (0.137) (0.107) (0.110) (0.095) (0.320)
Islamist Terrorism −0.038 −0.031 −0.037 −0.047∗ −0.016 −0.049
(0.027) (0.027) (0.057) (0.027) (0.039) (0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.020 0.042 −0.010
(0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.031) (0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.182∗∗ 0.173∗ −0.309 0.289∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.684∗∗
(0.065) (0.098) (0.466) (0.101) (0.070) (0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.135∗∗ −0.140 0.178 −0.154∗ −0.121 −0.476∗∗
(0.056) (0.091) (0.285) (0.089) (0.126) (0.223)
N 511 511 140 371 354 157
R2 0.402 0.239 0.356 0.444 0.418 0.431
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy,
infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged oil production, total trade,
total GDP, and post-coup election indicator.
Consistent with our theory, the interaction between Islamic Opposition and Islamist
Terrorism has a positive effect on monitors’ evaluations in both models 1 and 2. This
indicates that in countries with an Islamic opposition party, election monitors become more
likely to endorse an election as the level of Islamic terrorism increases. Since our models
take the underlying level of irregularities into account, this evidence suggests that monitors
display greater bias against Islamic movements in countries with Islamist terrorist groups.
Note that the coefficient sizes do not differ greatly between models 1 and 2, even though
in the latter we include country fixed-effects to absorb all time-invariant country-specific
differences, such as culture and colonial history. The stability of the coefficient suggests that
our finding is quiet robust and that the estimated effect in model 1 is predominately due to
within- rather than between-country variation.
To get a better sense of size we calculate marginal effects based on model 1. Figure 1
shows the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation for different levels of Islamist
terrorism on the probability of endorsement by international monitors with 95% confidence
13
intervals. The histogram in the bottom shows the distribution of Islamist Terrorism in our
sample.
Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Islamist Terrorism and Islamic Opposition Participation
0
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40
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80
0 3 207 50 150
Islamist Terrorist Killings
Figure shows the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation (and the 95% confidence interval around
it) on the probability of election monitors endorsing an election outcome given different levels of Islamist
terrorist killings.
Note that the presence of an Islamic opposition party does not seem to matter much
if there is no Islamist terrorism. The marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation is
about negative 10 percentage points if there is no ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign, but
the confidence interval for this estimate includes zero. We observe the most dramatic effect
when Islamic opposition parties and Islamist terrorists are jointly present. In a country
that suffered ten casualties to Islamist terrorism in the preceding year the marginal effect
of Islamic opposition participation is about 30 percentage points. As the number of Is-
lamist terrorist killings reach about fifty the marginal effect of Islamic opposition reaches 70
percentage points, making an endorsement virtually certain.
Returning to Table 1, in models 3 to 6 we explore variation between election monitors and
14
across time.71 Models 3 and 4 show that this anti-Islamic bias is absent in judgments of non-
Western election monitors but displayed by Western observers. For non-Western monitors
the main coefficient of interest, Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition, switches signs and is
imprecisely estimated. In contrast, the regression coefficients for western monitors are similar
to those in models 1 and 2: in particular, Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition has a large
positive impact on Western monitors’ endorsements. These results support our argument
that Western organizations are especially concerned about the danger Islamic movements
pose to stability and that these concerns, when compounded by Islamist terrorism, will
influence their evaluations of election quality.
Lastly, models 5 and 6 show that this bias gets stronger after 2001, when the 9/11 attacks
on the US magnified the threat posed by radical Islam. While the estimate for Islamist
Terrorism × Islamic Opposition is consistently positive, the coefficient in model 6 is almost
five times as large, indicating that the impact of the combination of Islamic opposition and
terrorism on electoral endorsement is significantly larger in the post-9/11 era. Interestingly,
all other coefficients related to terrorism in model 6, except for Islamist Terrorism × Islamic
Opposition are negative, suggesting that outside observers do not become more tolerant to
fraud by incumbents fighting terrorism in general; they only become more likely to endorse
elections where Islamic opposition parties and Islamist terrorism are jointly present.72
Robustness
Our findings are quite robust. Table 1 reports linear probability models, but given the
dichotomous nature of our dependent variable some might consider a Logit estimator a
more appropriate choice. Model 7 in Table 2 shows that the Logit estimator produces
71To ease interpretation we show split-sample regressions here. In Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 we also
present regressions with 3-way interactions to show that the difference in coefficients across samples discussed
are statistically significant.
72If we split the sample of Western monitors into pre- and post-9/11 eras, we again find that the effect of
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition is positive in both eras, but stronger after 9/11.
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Table 2: Robustness of Monitors’ Islamic Opposition Bias
Logit Alternative Terrorism in
Estimator Problem Definition Last 5 Years
(7) (8) (9)
Problems −2.525∗∗ −0.137∗∗ −0.337∗∗
(0.261) (0.050) (0.029)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.737 −0.179∗ −0.065
(0.539) (0.107) (0.119
Islamist Terrorism −0.245 −0.024 −0.01
(0.221) (0.043) (0.020
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.096 −0.002 −0.02
(0.105) (0.018) (0.018
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 1.451∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.489) (0.085) (0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −1.077∗∗ −0.121∗ −0.045∗
(0.372) (0.066) (0.025)
N 511 428 472
Log-Likelihood −203.336
R2 0.241 0.415
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the full set of control variables listed in the notes of Table 1.
qualitatively similar effects.73 Logit analyses on the differences between Western and non-
Western monitors and pre- and post-9/11 eras are provided in Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7.
The appendix also includes tests using a three-category version of our dependent variable
and the Ordered Logit estimator (see Appendix Table A.5). Our results hold in every case.
Next, we assess the implications of incumbents strategically choosing the level of fraud.
An incumbent favoured by outsiders may commit more fraud in order to take advantage of
their bias. Our model accounts for this by controlling for a monitor’s own assessment (Prob-
lems). However, it is possible that election monitors adjust their reporting of irregularities
in order to justify their summary evaluation. For this reason, we re-estimate our model using
a measure of electoral irregularities obtained from a different source, the National Elections
73Since Logit is a nonlinear estimator we plotted the marginal effects to confirm that our interpretation
of this interaction term is correct; see Appendix Figure A.1.
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in Democracies and Autocracies (NELDA) dataset.74 For maximum coverage we focus on
two indicators of electoral fairness: whether opposition leaders were prevented from running
and whether the government harassed the opposition. Adding these two variables gives us a
three-level index on the extent of electoral irregularities. Model 8 in Table 2 show that our
main finding is robust to replacing monitors’ Problems measure with this alternative, which
suggests that strategic reporting of underlying irregularities is not biasing our findings.
So far we have measured terrorist activity by counting the number of killings in the year
before elections. A one-year window may be shorter than what observers use to assess the
threat of radical Islam in a country. All of our results are robust to counting the number
of killings in the last 5 years (model 9 of Table 2). We also look at the number of attacks
as a measure of terrorist activity. Although our estimates on the full sample remain similar,
differences between subsamples are no longer statistically significant. From this discrepancy
we infer that outsiders pay more attention to the deadliness of terrorist activity than its
frequency.
Despite controlling for potential confounders, we cannot rule out the possibility that
unobservable factors lead us to mistakenly identify a significant association between our key
variables. In order to assess the likelihood that our observed effect is solely due to selection
bias, we follow a procedure proposed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber and adapted to linear
regressions by Bellows and Miguel.7576 We calculate the absolute ratio of the coefficient
estimated in a full model with all controls to the difference between the coefficient of the
full model and the one obtained from a restricted model, controlling only for Problems. The
result indicates how much greater the effect of potential unobservables would need to be
relative to the included observables in order for the coefficient estimate to be zero. Table 3
presents the ratios on the main interaction of interest for the four main models in Table 1.
None of the six ratios presented in Table 3 are smaller than 1 and they range from 1.89
74Hyde and Marinov 2012
75Altonji, Elder, and Taber 2005; Bellows and Miguel 2009
76We compute this ratio based on the linear probability models reported in Table 1.
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Table 3: Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables (Table 1)
All Countries Country Fixed-Effects Western Monitors Post-9/11
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 1.89 591.98 1.94 1.99
to 591.98, with a median ratio of 1.965. Hence, the selection effect of any unobservables
would have to be at least 1.89 times greater than selection on observables and, across all
four models, almost two times greater. This makes it unlikely that the estimated effect of
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition can be fully attributed to omitted variable bias.
We conducted several additional robustness checks that we summarize here; details pro-
vided in the appendix. First, we show in Appendix Figures A.2-A.5 that our findings are
not driven by a specific election or country: re-running our analyses while excluding one
election or country at-a-time does not change our findings. Likewise, omitting from the
sample the following types of observations do not weaken our results: countries with a small
Muslim population (and therefore without a realistic chance of Islamic parties emerging)
(see Appendix Table A.8); elections that are non-competitive (and therefore without a need
for outsiders to worry about opposition victory) (see Appendix Table A.9); countries that
experienced very high levels of Islamist terrorism recently (see Appendix Table A.10); coun-
tries where the incumbent has hostile relations with donor countries (and therefore outsiders’
concern for stability is low) (see Appendix Table A.11). Including additional measures of
donor preference (e.g., similarity of UN voting profiles) for the incumbent does not change
our findings either (see Appendix Table A.12).
Second, we conduct a series of tests related to how monitor organizations select which
elections to observe. To test whether differences in organizations that attend elections with
and without Islamic parties are driving our findings, we include monitor fixed effects to
purge “between-observer” variation; our results shown in Appendix Table A.13 continue to
hold based purely on “within-observer” variation. By a similar logic, might our result be
due to strategic monitoring decisions? If observers avoid problematic elections in friendly
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regimes so that they will not have to write a critical report, then that would make it harder
for us to find a discrepancy between their summary judgement and their list of observed
irregularities.77 Nevertheless, we run a Heckman selection model, which separately estimates
the probability of an organization observing an election (selection stage) and, if the election
is observed, the evaluation of its quality (outcome stage).78 To satisfy the identification
requirement we include in the first stage Global Election Count, which is the annual number
of elections held in countries that are not full democracies. The rationale for this variable
is that an organization is less likely to observe a particular election in a more crowded year,
because monitoring missions are costly and observer organizations have limited resources. As
shown in Appendix Table A.15 our main variable, Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition,
continues to raise the likelihood of endorsement, but it does not seem to have an effect at
the selection stage.
Third, it is possible that monitoring organizations are reluctant to contradict each other.
We conduct two analyses to check whether this kind of “bandwagoning” behavior drives
our results. Firstly, we cluster standard errors by election to account for correlation at the
election level. Secondly, we design a test based on the assumption that bandwagoning is more
likely within clusters of Western and non-Western organizations than across them. For each
election we randomly select one Western and one non-Western organization that observed
that election and run our analysis on this subsample.79 The threat of bandwagoning inflating
our estimates should be smaller in this subsample. Our findings shown in Appendix Tables
A.16 and A.17 continue to hold in both tests.
Fourth, Kelley’s DIEM starts in 1984.80 Although our theory applies primarily to the
post-Cold War period when donors’ concern for democracy is relatively higher, we check
and show that our findings are similar if we extend the analysis to 1984 (see Appendix
77We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out to us.
78Heckman 1979
79If monitors from only one group (e.g. Western) observed an election, than our subsample includes only
one organization for that election.
80Kelley 2012
19
Table A.18).
Fifth, the results are robust to using an alternative measure of Islamic Opposition Party
based on the Database of Political Institutions.81 This is a more restricted measure, because
it codes the religious identity of only the largest opposition party in a country and excludes
political parties that are banned. Nevertheless, we continue to find similar patterns using
this alternative measure (see Appendix Table A.19).
Sixth, we check that there is a linear interaction effect, that is, the effect of Islamic
opposition parties is greater for higher levels of Islamist terrorism as hypothesized. We show
in Appendix Tables A.20-A.22 that the interaction effect is stronger for high levels of Islamist
terrorism compared to low and zero Islamist terrorism.
Finally, we test whether IGOs and NGOs evaluate elections with Islamic parties differ-
ently, but we do not find significant differences. NGO’s are often more independent than
IGO’s, but still have close ties to donor states through funding and leadership.82 Conse-
quently, it is not surprising that NGO and IGO monitors share similar concerns regarding
stability and democracy in elections (see Appendix Table A.23).
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate which factors determine outside observers’ decision to endorse
or reject an election’s outcome. We provide empirical evidence that election observers in
the post-Cold War period are more likely to accept problematic elections in which Islamic
opposition parties participate while an Islamist terrorist campaign is ongoing. We show that
this conditional bias is particularly strong for Western observers. We also show that the
effect has become stronger after 2001, when the USA began its War on Terror.
Together these findings provide important clues about the powerful political forces that
influence even seemingly-independent observers of democratic processes. In countries mired
81Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016
82Kelley 2010; Robinson 1996
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by violent Islamist terrorist campaigns, many Western observers saw Islamic opposition par-
ties as a risk to stability and this led observers to endorse elections that they would otherwise
reject. This observation resembles the trade-offs Western countries perceived between pro-
moting democracy and maintaining friendly regimes during the Cold War. The broad lesson
is that when “taking sides in other people’s elections”83, outsiders’ calculus is based not only
on their relations with the incumbent, but their relative bias toward the incumbent and the
challengers.
Our work has important policy implications in light of recent work on what makes vot-
ers believe election monitors. Bush and Prather present evidence that voters are less likely
to believe the assessment of monitors that are seen as biased.84 If voters recognize that
international monitors have a bias against Islamic opposition parties, this recognition will
undermine monitors’ credibility and reduce their ability to inform voters about election qual-
ity. Regardless of the validity of suspicions about Islamic parties, outsiders should consider
separating election monitoring and combating extremism to avoid unwanted outcomes.
With regard to future research, it will be interesting to see if our theory applies to other
forms of outside interventions in elections.85 For instance, Kersting and Kilby show that
World Bank lending responds to upcoming elections in borrowing countries.86 A testable
implication of our theory is that World Bank lending should be quicker and more generous in
countries with an Islamic challenger and an ongoing Islamist terrorist campaign. Second, our
research raises the question of how non-Western powers such as Russia and China perceive
different types of challengers as these powers intervene in elections in other countries. Third,
our research highlights the important effect terrorist groups can have when an ideologically
related party is participating in elections. It will be fruitful to explore when political par-
ties disown ideologically related violent groups and what strategies they use to signal their
credibility to domestic and international audiences.
83Corstange and Marinov 2012, 655
84Bush and Prather 2017b
85Corstange and Marinov 2012
86Kersting and Kilby 2016
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Appendix to “Dangerous Contenders”
Kerim Can Kavakli and Patrick M Kuhn
Overview of Appendix
The appendix includes summary statistics, robustness checks, additional figures and other
information that were not included in the main text due to space constraints. Specifically,
we present the following:
• Omitting one election or one country at-a-time does not weaken our results.
• Our results are robust to using the 3-level Election Quality as the dependent variable
and the Ordered Logit estimator to analyze it.
• Differences in the estimate of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition between West-
ern and non-Western organizations are statistically significant.
• Differences in the estimate of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition between pre-
and post-9/11 periods are statistically significant.
• Our results are robust to limiting our analysis to countries where at least 30% of the
population is Muslim.
• Our results are robust to limiting our analysis to elections that are at least minimally
competitive.
• Our results are robust to omitting observations with very high levels of Islamic terror-
ism.
• Our results are robust to additional tests of ensuring that donors care about stability
in a country.
• Our results are robust to the inclusion of monitoring organization fixed effects.
• Our results are robust to omitting SADC, CIS and the Commonwealth from the sample.
• Our results are robust to using a Heckman model to account for selective monitoring
by election observers.
• Our results are robust to clustering errors at the election level.
• Our results are robust in a smaller sample where, for each election, we randomly choose
one Western and one non-Western monitoring organization and discard the other or-
ganizations that observed that election. This is a test to mitigate bias introduced by
bandwagoning behavior among monitors.
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• Our results are generally robust to extending our analysis to the pre-1990 period.
• Our results are robust to using an alternative measure of Islamic Opposition.
• The effect of the interaction term is linear; it gets stronger as the level of Islamist
terrorism increases.
• IGO and NGO monitors do not seem to differ in terms of their evaluations of elections
where Islamic opposition parties and Islamist terrorism are jointly present.
• Our results continue to hold if we extend our analysis to 2012 using alternative data
sources.
• The last two tables show the full versions of Tables 1 and 2 in the paper including the
control variables.
Summary Statistics
Table A.1: This table reports summary statistics for the observations used in Table 1.
List of Western and Non-Western Monitoring Organizations
Table A.2: We provide a list of Western and non-Western monitoring organizations. We
distinguish between Western and non-Western organizations based on their membership (for
IGOs) or the location of their headquarters (NGOs).
List of Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties and Islamist Terror-
ism and Islamic Opposition but no Islamic Terrorism
Table A.3 lists the cases with an Islamic opposition party and Islamist terrorism. Table A.4
lists the cases with an Islamic opposition party but no Islamist terrorism.
Marginal Effects Based on Logit Model
Figure A.1: This figure plots the marginal effect of Islamic opposition parties on election
observer endorsements. The calculations are based on the Logit estimates in Table 2 model
7. We also provide 95% confidence intervals around estimates. We create this plot by
varying Islamic Opposition, Islamist Terrorism and Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition;
all other variables are held at their observed values. This figure shows that both Islamic
opposition and Islamist terrorist campaigns must be present for monitors to overlook election
fraud. Elections that include Islamic opposition parties without an ongoing Islamist terrorist
campaign are not more likely to be endorsed by international monitors. However, as the level
of Islamist terrorism increases, so does the marginal effect Islamic opposition parties. The
substantive effects are comparable to those based on the OLS model. In a country that
suffered 10 killings by Islamist terrorists, the marginal effect of an Islamist party in elections
is about 20 percentage points.
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Omitting One Country/Election at-a-time From the Analysis
Figures A.2 and A.3: To test whether a few observations (elections or countries) are
driving our results we conduct the following sensitivity analyses. We focus on how much the
estimate of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition changes across these analyses. First,
we re-run our analyses omitting one election at a time (255 regressions) and then one coun-
try at a time (93 regressions). We display the findings graphically. Figure A.2 shows the
distribution of coefficients when we exclude one election at a time. Figure A.3 shows the
distribution of coefficients when we exclude one country at a time.
The coefficient of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition is 0.18 in the original analysis.
Figures A.2 and A.3 show that omitting particular elections or countries does not make the
coefficient much smaller. In other words, the estimated effect size is not sensitive to omitting
particular observations.
Figures A.4 and A.5: In these figures we display how much the t-values of Islamist
Terrorism × Islamic Opposition changes when we omit from the sample one election or one
country at a time. These figures show that the t-values do not fall below 2.4, which is further
evidence that the estimated effect is not sensitive to omitting particular observations.
Using Alternative Dependent Variable: 3-level Election Quality
Table A.5: Our main dependent variable, Acceptable, is a dichotomous version of the three-
level Election Quality variable in the Dataset on International Election Monitoring.1 This
table shows that our results in Table 1 are robust to using the three-level Election Quality
as the dependent variable and the Ordered Logit estimator to analyze it.
Differences Between Western and Non-Western Monitors
Table A.6: In Table 1 we present split-sample analyses to highlight differences between
Western and non-Western monitors. Although the coefficients for Islamist Terrorism ×
Islamic Opposition differ quite substantively between subsamples, we still need to show that
the differences are statistically significant.2 For this purpose we now show estimates from a
model where we interact our main variables with a Western indicator, which is coded 1 for
Western monitors and 0 otherwise. We analyze this model using OLS, Logit and Ordered
Logit estimators. Our claim is that Western monitors, relative to non-Western monitors, are
more likely to express an anti-Islamist bias captured by our Islamist Terrorism × Islamic
Opposition variable. Our data support this claim; the interaction of Western and Islamist
Terrorism × Islamic Opposition (which is in bold in Table A.6) is always positive and
statistically significant in Logit and Ordered Logit estimates.
1Kelley 2012
2Gelman and Stern 2006
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Differences Between Pre- and Post-9/11 Eras
Table A.7: This table, similar to Table A.6, aims to show that the split-sample comparisons
we report in Table 1 between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 periods are statistically significant.
Here we show estimates from a model where we interact our main variables with a Post-9/11
Era indicator, which is coded 1 for elections after 2001 and 0 otherwise. We analyze this
model using OLS, Logit and Ordered Logit estimators. Our claim is that anti-Islamic bias
(captured by our Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition variable) is stronger after the
9/11 attacks. Our data support this claim; the interaction of Post-9/11 Era and Islamist
Terrorism × Islamic Opposition (which is in bold in Table A.7) is always positive and
statistically significant in OLS and Ordered Logit estimates.
Restrict Sample to Countries where Muslim Population > 30%
Table A.8: Here we limit our analysis to countries where at least 30% of the population is
Muslim. We choose the 30% threshold, because the smallest Muslim population percentage
of a country with an Islamic opposition party is 31%. When we analyze this sample with
the terrorism variables measured in the 1-year window we have problems: OLS results are
positive but not significant and Logit and Ordered Logit cannot estimate this coefficient due
to multicollinearity. When we use the terrorism variables with the 5-year window, which
were introduced in Table 2, we find that Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition is both
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all three estimators.
Restrict Sample to Minimally Competitive Elections
Table A.9: Here we limit our analysis to elections that are at least somewhat competitive
or the result was not decided before the election. We conduct this robustness check, because
our theory says that election monitors tolerate fraud against Islamic parties to prevent
a more preferable incumbent’s fall from power. If an incumbent does not even pretend
to run a fair contest then the public is already sure about the quality of elections and
whether monitors endorse an election will not influence the public’s decision to protest or
not. If a monitor’s announcement cannot influence the public’s decision to protest, then
the monitor does not have an incentive to lie to protect the incumbent. For this reason,
our findings should be robust in an analysis that includes only those elections that are at
least minimally competitive. According to Hyde and Marinov we can consider an election
(minimally) competitive if (a) opposition was allowed, and (b) more than one party was
legal, and (c) there was a choice of candidates on the ballot.3 Using their NELDA dataset4
we code which countries ran competitive elections for the years in our dataset and then
re-run our analysis in the subsample of those countries. Table A.9 shows that our finding is
robust regardless of which estimator we use.
3Hyde and Marinov 2012
4Ibid.
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Omit Observations with Extreme Levels of Islamist Terrorism
Table A.10: Here we test whether observations with high levels of Islamist terrorism are
driving our findings. We first drop the observation with the highest number of killings by
Islamists in the preceding year (model 1) and then we omit the three observations that
suffered more than 100 killings by Islamists in the preceding year (model 2). In both cases
our main results are robust, which raises our confidence that observations with particularly
high levels of Islamist terrorism are not driving our results.
Additional Tests Regarding Donor Preference for Stability
Table A.11: Our theory assumes that international actors see Islamic opposition groups,
especially in the context of an ongoing Islamic terrorist campaign, as a threat to stability.
However, if outsiders’ relations with an incumbent are sufficiently bad, then outsiders may
prefer even an Islamic group to the current government and refuse to overlook electoral irreg-
ularities.5 So far we have included four measures (Oil Production, Colony Indicator, Total
Trade and Total GDP) that aim to capture the importance of stability in a country for the
outside world. Here we follow a different strategy and exclude from our sample countries
that have poor relations with international monitors’ donors. It is difficult to determine the
influential donors for most non-Western monitoring organizations and especially larger ones
such as the United Nations. However, for Western monitors we can assume that a good
measure of relations between their sponsors and an incumbent in an election is the relations
between the incumbent and the US. We run two tests in which we analyze the evaluations of
Western monitors but exclude from the sample countries that have poor relations with the
US. First, we exclude countries that are under security-related economic sanctions by the
US. Second, we exclude countries whose UN voting similarity to the US is below the sample
average (-0.2). In both tests our estimates are similar to our baseline estimate in Table 1
model 4, which increases our confidence that our findings are driven by cases in which donors
actually value the stability they enjoy under an incumbent.
Table A.12: Here we include additional measures of donor interest in a country. As further
robustness checks we focus on the verdicts of Western monitoring organizations and add to
our analysis two more time-varying indicators of Western alignment. These indicators are
UN Voting Similarity with the USA and Aid per Capita Given by OECD Donors (logged,
constant USD). Our results remain robust after controlling for these factors.
Monitoring Organization Fixed Effects
Table A.13: In this table we show what happens if we include monitoring organization
dummies to our model. The purpose of this test is to control for “between-organization”
variation and rely only on “within-organization” variation to estimate our model. The
coefficient of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition is statistically significant and quite
similar to its estimate in Table 1 Model 1, which implies that our results are not due to
different types of organizations visiting different types of countries.
5Bubeck and Marinov 2017
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Exclude Monitoring Organizations that Generally Endorse Election
Outcomes
Table A.14: Here we show that our results are robust to excluding the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), the Commonwealth, and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) from our sample. These organizations are sometimes considered par-
ticularly tolerant to problematic elections. Excluding these organizations from the sample
individually or jointly does not change our findings.
Heckman Selection Models
Table A.15: Here we investigate whether selective monitoring by observers can explain our
findings. As explained in the main text, one possibility is observers prefer to skip problematic
elections in friendly regimes in order to avoid criticizing a favored incumbent. This kind of
selective monitoring would make it more difficult for us to find a pattern of discrepancy
between observers’ summary evaluations and the longer list of irregularities in their full
report.
Nevertheless, observers may be unable to select which elections to monitor because of
strategic or logistical reasons. Since there are no reports for observer missions that did not
take place, analysis based on this nonrandom sample may be misleading. We deal with this
problem by running a Heckman selection model, which separately estimates the probability
of an organization observing an election (selection stage) and, if the election is observed, the
evaluation of its quality (outcome equation).6 To satisfy the identification requirement of
the estimator, we include in the first stage, in addition to our standard set of independent
variables, a Global Election Count variable that is the number of elections held in countries
that are not full democracies in a given year.7 Since election monitoring is costly in terms of
money and time and observer organizations have limited resources, we expect an organization
to be less likely to observe a particular election in a more crowded year. Therefore we expect,
controlling for other factors, this variable to have a negative effect at the selection stage.
In addition to running this analysis on the whole sample (columns 1 and 2), we explore
differences between non-Western (columns 3 and 4) and Western organizations (columns
5 and 6). We cannot explore differences between the pre- and post-9/11 periods, because
the model does not converge on the post-9/11 sample. Results from the Heckman model
confirm our expectation and show that the selection and outcome stages are significantly
related. Global Election Count is negative and significant at the selection stage in all three
analyses.
Turning to our main variable, Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition does not seem
to have an effect at the selection stage in any of the three samples (columns 2, 4 and 6). It
increases the likelihood of endorsement in the whole sample, which supports our main pre-
diction (column 1). We also find support for our prediction regarding the difference between
Western and non-Western organizations. Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition increases
the likelihood of endorsement by Western organizations, but not non-Western organizations.
6Heckman 1979
7We follow convention and categorize countries that have a Polity2 score of greater than 6 as full democ-
racies.
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Clustering Standard Errors at Election Level
Table A.16: Here we cluster standard errors at the election level and find that our results
do not change. The goal of this test is to take into account possible bandwagoning among
monitoring organizations, which would violate the assumption that election observer verdicts
from an election are independent.
Restrict Sample to One Western and Non-Western Observer Per
Election
Table A.17: Here we conduct another test against the possibility that election monitors
bandwagon and take into account other monitors’ verdicts before announcing their own. If
monitoring organizations bandwagon, we expect Western organizations and Non-Western
organizations to be influenced primarily among themselves. Based on this intuition, we
take a subset of our sample that includes, for each election, only 1 monitoring organization
from each bloc (Western and non-Western). If there are multiple organizations from one
bloc in a given election, then we randomly pick one of them. If there were no monitors
from a given bloc, then our subset includes only one organization for that election and
this organization comes from the other bloc. This procedure reduces our sample size from
511 to 324. We then re-run our analysis on this subset. Since this subset includes only 1
organization from each bloc, tendency to bandwagon should not bias our results. Since we
select these organizations randomly within each bloc, we do not believe we are introducing
other biases into the analysis. Results from this test are generally similar to our original
ones, which suggests that bandwagoning between organizations is not the main driver of our
findings.
Extend Analysis to Pre-1990 Observations
Table A.18: Here we extend our analysis to the pre-1990 period. Our theory mainly applies
to the Post-Cold War era when the importance of major power rivalry and stability declined
and Western governments began to promote democracy. Nevertheless since Kelley’s dataset8
starts from 1984 we explore what happens if we include the pre-1990 observations in our sam-
ple. Expanding our sample does not change the results if we measure terrorist activity by
the number of attacks. Our results are also robust when we measure terrorist activity by
the number of killings conditional on omitting one observation, the October 1990 legislative
election in Pakistan monitored by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), from the sam-
ple. As explained below, we believe that dropping the October 1990 election in Pakistan
is justified and our results continue to hold if we extend the analysis to the period before 1990.
The NDI endorsed the election results despite moderate problems in election quality. The
outcome in this observation is not predicted well by our statistical model, because there was
an Islamic opposition party, but no recent attacks by Islamist terrorist groups. In addition,
the election is not coded as a first multiparty election, a transitional election, or a post-
conflict election by Kelley. In short, neither we, nor Kelley expect election monitors to
8Kelley 2012
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tolerate electoral irregularities in this case. We read the NDI’s report on the 1990 election
to understand how it justified its decision to endorse the election outcome. Firstly, the
NDI argues that “notwithstanding serious irregularities in certain constituencies ... the
results in most constituencies reflect the will of the electorate” (NDI, v). Secondly, the
NDI highlights in the executive summary section that the 1990 election occurred “less than
two years after elections in 1988, which were viewed at the time as signifying an important
step in Pakistans transition to democracy” (NDI, iv). The NDI considered Pakistan as an
“emerging democracy”, which faces “enormous political and economic challenges” (NDI, ix).
In its report, the NDI urged the international community to “contribute, where appropriate,
to strengthen democratic processes and political pluralism in Pakistan.” (NDI, ix). Our
impression is that the NDI’s favorable report reflects the logic explained by Kelley in her 2009
International Organization article, that international organizations sometimes may endorse
an election despite its flaws in order to reward relative progress and not cause democratic
gains to unravel. However, the quantitative indicators we borrow from Kelley (transitional
election, post-conflict election, first MP election) do not capture the NDI’s concerns in the
case of Pakistan in 1990.
Alternative Measure of Islamic Opposition
Table A.19: Here we use an alternative measure of Islamic Opposition based on the
Database of Political Institutions.9 This database includes a variable named OPP1REL,
which reports whether religious issues are a key component of the largest opposition party
in a country and, if so, which specific religion (Christian, Catholic, Muslim or Hindu) this
party promotes. Our alternative Islamic Opposition is coded 1 for any country-year for
which OPP1REL is “Muslim”, and 0 otherwise. This variable is more restricted than our
original variable, because the Database of Political Institutions does not take into account
banned political parties and, among existing parties, it codes the religious ideology of only
the largest opposition party. Nevertheless, our main variable Islamist Terrorism × Islamic
Opposition remains positive and statistically significant.
Linear Effect of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition
Tables A.20, A.21 and A.22: According to our theory outsiders’ bias against Islamic
opposition parties will increase with the level of Islamist terrorism in a country. Hainmueller,
Mummolo and Xu show that even if the interaction term is positive, the effect may not be
linear.10 Their diagnostic tools are not suitable for our analysis, because we have a binary
dependent variable. To check the linearity assumption we create a categorical version of
our Islamist Terrorism variable and use that in our model.11 This new variable has three
categories: 0-“none”, 1-“low” and 2-“high”. It is coded 0 if there is no Islamist terrorism
in a given country-year; 1 if the level of Islamist killings is greater than 0 and less than 25,
which is the mean for countries struck by Islamist terrorism; 2 if the level of Islamist killings
is greater than 25. Results confirm that the interaction effect gets stronger as the level of
9Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016
10Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 2018
11We do the same for the Non-Islamist Terrorism.
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Islamist terrorism goes from none to low to high.12 A second advantage of this test is to
show that our model has enough observations even at high levels of terrorism.13
Comparison of IGO and NGO Monitors
Table A.23: Here we explore whether IGO and NGO monitors evaluate elections with
Islamist parties differently. We first split the sample and run separate regressions on IGO
monitors (model 1) and NGO monitors (model 2). Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition
is positive and significant at the 10% level in the IGO sample whereas in the NGO sample the
coefficent estimate is three times larger but statistically insignificant. The lack of significance
may be due to the smaller sample of NGO monitors. In model 3 we explore the difference
between IGO and NGO monitors by interacting our main variables with an IGO indicator
variable that is coded 1 for IGO monitors and 0 otherwise. IGO × Islamist Terrorism ×
Islamic Opposition is positive but the coefficient is much smaller than the standard error,
which tells us that there is not a meaningful difference between IGO and NGOs. Finally,
in model 4, we re-run this model only for Western monitors and we again fail to find any
significant differences. We conclude that there is not any evidence that IGO and NGO
monitors differ in their evaluations.
Extend Analysis to 2012
Table A.24: We wanted to see if our findings hold beyond 2004, which is when the de-
tailed dataset on election monitors (DIEM) compiled by Kelley ends.14 For this purpose
we conduct the following analysis, which uses a dataset reaching up to 2012. Importantly,
extending the analysis to this period requires us to accept some data limitations (explained
below). As a result, we see this additional analysis as a plausibility test rather than a strict
test of our hypotheses. Despite these limitations, we find that our main result continues to
hold in this extended dataset.
To conduct this analysis we use the NELDA dataset15, which includes elections held between
1945-2012. The NELDA dataset differs from DIEM in three important aspects relevant to
our analysis. First, DIEM provides information on the endorsements and criticisms of both
Western and non-Western election observers, but NELDA has information on only criticisms
made by Western organizations. From NELDA we can find out whether non-Western ob-
servers were present at an election, but we do not know if they critized election quality or
endorsed the outcome. Second, DIEM is an observer-election level dataset, while NELDA is
an election-level dataset. When multiple organizations monitor an election, DIEM provides
information about their evaluations separately, whereas in NELDA there is one variable cod-
ing whether there were allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western observers present.
12According to Wald tests the coefficient of “high” is significantly greater at the 5% level relative to “low”
when we use Logit (p-value = 0.03) but not when we use OLS (p-value = 0.14).
13When calculating the marginal effects in Table A.22, other variables are held at their observed values in
the sample.
14Kelley 2012
15Hyde and Marinov 2012
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Third, DIEM provides information about an observer organization’s summary statement (en-
dorsement decision) and list of electoral irregularities separately. NELDA, on the other hand,
only provides the aforementioned variable about the existence of fraud allegations (by any
Western observer group).
While we are lucky to have the NELDA dataset and expand our analysis to a more recent
period, these differences between DIEM and NELDA require a few changes to our analysis.
First, because NELDA provides information on criticisms by Western observers only, we
cannot test for differences between Western and non-Western observers. Second, because
NELDA is an election-level dataset and codes criticisms by “any” Western observers, we
cannot observe cases where multiple Western observers were present and some of them did
not criticize the election quality. As a result, we have fewer observations (one) per election
even though we have more observations in total because more elections take place in the
longer time period. Third, because NELDA does not separately code Western observers’
endorsement of election outcome and list of election irregularities, we need to construct
these variables ourselves. As an indicator of non-endorsement, we use “significant vote-fraud
allegations”. As a measure of general election quality, we use information on government
harassment against the opposition in general and opposition leaders more specifically. This
substitute is appropriate since we already used it as a robustness check in our main analysis.
Our dependent variable is whether there were significant vote-fraud allegations by any West-
ern observers present at an election. Since this is the opposite of an endorsement, we expect
the joint presence of Islamic opposition parties and terrorists to lower the likelihood of fraud
allegations by Western observers. Our main control variable (Problems) is a sum of two
binary indicators of election fraud: whether the government harassed the opposition and
whether the government prevented opposition candidates from running. These two variables
are good indicators of election irregularity and they are non-missing for most observations
in NELDA. This variable varies between 0 and 2.16
Our main explanatory variables, Islamic Opposition and Islamist Terrorism, are measured
as follows. Data sources used in our original analysis do not reach 2012 and for that reason
we use two new sources. We measure the presence of Islamic opposition using the Database
of Political Institutions (DPI).17 We also used this variable as a robustness check on our
original measure of Islamic opposition. Its main drawback is that it codes only whether the
biggest opposition party in a country is Islamic or not.18
To measure Islamist (and non-Islamist) terrorism until 2012 we to turn to the Global Ter-
16Observations where both variables are missing we code as 0. Coding these observations as 2 does not
change our results.
17Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini 2016
18When we extend our time frame there are more Islamic incumbents in the data. Our theory does not
make a clear prediction about the effect of having an Islamic incumbent, because whether they raise concerns
in the eyes of foreign observers will be influenced by their policies in office. Islamic incumbents are outside
the scope of our analysis and we exclude those cases from the sample.
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rorism Database (GTD)19, which covers a more recent period than our original our data
source, the RAND database.20 Its main drawback is that, unlike RAND, GTD does not
code the ideology (Islamist or not) of the terrorist group. There are 1461 terrorist groups in
the GTD database between 1985 and 2017, so coding their ideologies by hand is not feasible.
We overcome this limitation in the following way. First, we create a list of word-stems that
differentiate the names of Islamist terrorist groups from others. These words are “islam,
jihad, jama(at), sharia, mojah(hid), muja(hid), muslim, allah, qaida, salafi”. We code ter-
rorist groups that have these word stems in their name as Islamist.21 Next, we look at a list
of “highly deadly” groups in the GTD (defined as groups that killed more than 100 people
in total) and we add to our list of Islamist terrorists any highly deadly Islamist groups that
were not captured with the word-stem method.22 In total we code 236 groups as Islamist
and 1225 groups as non-Islamist. Using this classification we create measures of the (logged)
number of people killed by Islamist and non-Islamist groups in every country-year. As a
quality check we compare these new measures of Islamist and non-Islamist terrorism with
the numbers we got from the RAND database and they are highly correlated.23 As in our
original analysis we measure terrorism in the last 1 year, and alternatively, in the last 5 years.
Our list of controls is the same as in the original analysis. Information on Muslim population
percentage, level of democracy, change in democracy, infant mortality rate, former colony
status, oil production, total trade and total GDP comes from the sources cited in the main
text. Of the control variables we took from DIEM, information on election violence, the
type of election (legislative or not) and whether this is the first multi-party election is found
in NELDA. NELDA does not code information on transitional election, post-civil war and
post-coup elections. We create new measures of post-civil war and post-coup elections using
data from Powell and Thyne and Themne´r and Wallensteen.24 If the country holding the
election experienced a civil war in the last 5 years, we code it as a post-civil war election;
otherwise that variable is coded 0. The post-coup variable is created in a similar way. We do
not have an indicator of transitional elections here, but we do not believe this is an important
omission, because this variable is rarely estimated to have a significant effect in our original
analysis.
Our estimator, as in the original analysis, is the OLS. We also report regressions with
country-fixed effects. In all models standard errors are clustered by country.
Table A.24 presents the results. In Models 1 and 2, where we measure terrorism by the
number of killings in the last 1 year, the results are not very stable. Model 1, where control
variables are not included, shows a negative effect of Islamic Opposition × Islamist Terror
19START 2018
20RAND 2015
21We also check that groups coded as Islamist this way do not include non-Islamist groups.
22These groups are Al-Shaabab, Taliban, Al-Nusrah Front, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Abu Sayyaf Group,
and Allied Democratic Forces.
23The correlation of “Islamist terrorism” measures is about 0.8 and the correlation of “non-Islamist ter-
rorism” measures is about 0.7.
24Powell and Thyne 2011; Themne´r and Wallensteen 2011
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on Western criticism (p = 0.103), which is consistent with our main hypothesis. However,
this effect becomes (statistically and substantively) insignificant when we include controls.
The results are much more robust in Models 3 to 6, where we measure terrorism by the
number of killings in the last 5 years. In models 3 to 5 we find that the joint presence
of Islamist Terrorism and Islamic Opposition makes Western criticism less likely. Model 3
is the sparse model; in Models 4 and 5 we include the control variables and country-fixed
effects. These results show that our main finding regarding the effect of Islamic movements
and Western election monitoring continues to hold when we extend the analysis to 2012. In
model 6 we test whether this effect becomes stronger after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Model
6, which interacts our key independent variables with a post-2001 indicators, shows that
the negative effect of Islamic Opposition × Islamist Terror on Western observer criticism
is stronger in the post-9/11 era. Interestingly, in Model 6, the variable Islamic Opposition
× Islamist Terror becomes insignificant, but given the limitations in data, this divergence
from the original results is not surprising.
Figure A.6 shows the estimated effect of joint presence of Islamic opposition participation
and Islamist terrorism, based on Model 3. Note that in this figure we see that these two
factors lower the probability of criticism by Western observers and in figure 1 we see that
these two factors increase the probability of observers endorsing an election outcome; there-
fore these two graphs show similar effects. Moreover, the graphs indicate similar effect sizes.
As we move from zero Islamist killings to the 90th percentile in our sample, the probability
of Western observers criticizing the election falls about 70%.
To summarize, in this section we reported a plausibility test on whether our main result,
that the joint presence of Islamic opposition groups and terrorists makes Western observers
less likely to criticize election outcomes, holds in a sample extending to 2012. We find that
the results are broadly similar to our analysis in the main text. This consistency raises our
confidence in our main findings.
Full Versions of Tables 1 and 2
Table A.25: Table 1 in the main text omits the controls due to space constraints. Here we
present the full regression table, which includes all the controls.
Table A.26: Table 2 in the main text omits the controls due to space constraints. Here we
present the full regression table, which includes all the controls.
12
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Acceptable 0.648 0.478 0 1
Problems 1.521 0.716 0 3
Islamic Opposition 0.074 0.263 0 1
Islamist Terrorism (logged) 0.161 0.698 0 5.257
Non-Islamist Terrorism (logged) 0.570 1.223 0 6.275
Muslim Population % 0.179 0.266 0 0.989
Level of Democracy 4.145 4.823 -9 10
Change in Democracy 1.037 3.251 -14 15
Infant Mortality Rate (logged) 3.506 0.769 1.411 5.047
First Multiparty Election 0.157 0.364 0 1
Transitional Election 0.092 0.289 0 1
Post-Conflict Election 0.104 0.305 0 1
Post-Coup Election 0.023 0.152 0 1
Pre-Election Violence 1.215 1.170 0 3
Legislative Election 0.773 0.419 0 1
Oil Production (logged) 4.039 3.964 0 12.420
Total Trade (logged) 8.283 2.343 0 13.387
Total GDP (logged) 23.106 1.652 19.450 27.941
Former Colony 0.286 0.452 0 1
N =511
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Table A.2: Western and Non-Western Monitoring Organizations
Western The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope, the European Parliament, Norwegian Helsinki Com-
mittee, the Council of Europe, the European Union (Com-
mission), the International Foundation for Electoral Sys-
tems, the National Democratic Institute, the International
Republican Institute, the Carter Center, and the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group
Non-Western The United Nations, the South African Development
Community, the Electoral Institute of South Africa, the
Organization of American States, the Commonwealth Sec-
retariat, the Asian Network for Free Elections, and the
Commonwealth of Independent States
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Table A.3: Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties and Islamist Terrorism
Country Year
Monitoring
Organization
Election Type
Islamic Opposition
Party
Algeria 1997 The National Democratic Institute Legislative Harakat al-Nahda al-Islamiyya
Harakat Mujtama’ al-Salim
Uzbekistan 1999 OSCE Legislative Shura-i-Islam (banned)
Shura-i-Ulema (banned)
Pakistan 1997 The Commonwealth Secretariat Legislative Jamaat-e-Islami
Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam
Pakistan 2002 The European Union Legislative Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
Pakistan 2002 The Asian Network for Free Elections Legislative see above
Pakistan 2002 The European Parliament Legislative see above
Pakistan 2002 The Commonwealth Secretariat Legislative see above
Indonesia 2004 The European Parliament Legislative Partai Amanat Nasional
Partai Bintang Reformasi
Partai Bulan Bintang
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia 2004 The Asian Network for Free Elections Legislative see above
Indonesia 2004 The European Union Legislative see above
Indonesia 2004 The Carter Center Executive Hamzah Haz, Leader of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia 2004 The European Union Executive see above
Indonesia 2004 The Asian Network for Free Elections Executive see above
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Table A.4: Cases with Islamic Opposition Parties but No Islamist Terrorism
Country Year
Monitoring
Organization
Election Type
Islamic Opposition
Party
Mali 2002 The Carter Center Executive Islamic parties banned
Senegal 1993 The National Democratic Institute Legislative Islamic parties banned
Tanzania 1995 The Commonwealth Secretariat General Chama cha Wananchi & ban
Tanzania 1995 IFES General see above
Tanzania 2000 South African Development Community General Chama cha Wananchi & ban
Tanzania 2000 The Commonwealth Secretariat General see above
Tanzania 2000 IFES General see above
Tanzania 2000 Electoral Commission Forum of SADC General see above
Morocco 1993 IFES Legislative Proto-PJD was denied participation
Turkey 2002 Norwegian Helsinki Center Legislative Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi
Turkey 2002 OSCE Legislative Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi
Yemen 1993 The International Republican Institute Legislative Tajammu’ al-Yamani li’l-Islah
Yemen 1997 The National Democratic Institute Legislative Tajammu’ al-Yamani li’l-Islah
Yemen 2003 The National Democratic Institute Legislative Tajammu’ al-Yamani li’l-Islah
Tajikistan 2000 OSCE Legislative Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
Uzbekistan 1994 OSCE Legislative Islamic groups banned by regime
Pakistan 1993 The Commonwealth Secretariat Legislative Islamic Jamhoori Mahaz
Jamaat-e-Islami
Mutahida Deeni Mahaz
Pakistan 1993 The National Democratic Institute Legislative see above
Bangladesh 1991 The National Democratic Institute Legislative Islami Oikkya Jote
Jamaat-e-Islami
Bangladesh 1991 The Commonwealth Secretariat Legislative see above
Malaysia 1999 The Asian Network for Free Elections Legislative Parti Islam Se-Malaysia
Indonesia 1999 The Asian Network for Free Elections Legislative Partai Amanat Nasional
Partai Bulan Bintang
Partai Keadilan
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
Indonesia 1999 The European Union Legislative see above
Indonesia 1999 IFES Legislative see above
Indonesia 1999 The National Democratic Institute Legislative see above
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Figure A.1: Marginal Effect of Islamic Opposition Participation on Endorsement Probability
from Logit Model (Table 2 Model 7)
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Figure shows the marginal effect of Islamic opposition participation (and the 95% confidence interval around
it) on the probability of election monitors endorsing an election outcome given different levels of Islamist
terrorist killings. We use the estimates from the Logit model (Table 2 Model 7). Other variables are held at
their observed values in the sample.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Coefficients of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition When
We Exclude Elections One at a Time
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Figure shows the distribution of coefficients of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition when we re-run
our main model while leaving out one election at a time (255 regressions). The black vertical line (dashed)
marks 0.182, which is the estimate for Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition in the main model.
18
Figure A.3: Distribution of Coefficients of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition When
We Exclude Countries One at a Time
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Figure shows the distribution of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition when we re-run our main model
while leaving out one country at a time (93 regressions). The black vertical line (dashed) marks 0.182, which
is the estimate for Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition in the main model.
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Figure A.4: Distribution of t-values of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition When We
Exclude Elections One at a Time
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Figure shows the distribution of t-values for Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition when we re-run our
main model while leaving out one election at a time (255 regressions).
20
Figure A.5: Distribution of t-values of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition When We
Exclude Countries One at a Time
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Figure shows the distribution of Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition when we re-run our main model
while leaving out one country at a time (93 regressions).
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Figure A.6: Marginal Effects of Islamic Opposition Participation on Western Criticism
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Figure shows the change in the probability of Western observers making allegation of significant vote-fraud
(with 95% CI’s) as a result of Islamic opposition party participation, conditional on different levels of Islamist
terrorism. Results are based on Model 3 in Table A.24.
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Table A.5: Ordered Logit Analysis of Three-Category Dependent Variable
All Countries Non-Western Western Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Monitors Monitors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.491 −1.469∗ −0.486 −0.119 −1.265
(0.527) (0.877) (0.536) (0.690) (2.625)
Islamist Terrorism −0.179 −0.468 −0.152 −0.102 −0.338∗
(0.161) (0.324) (0.171) (0.486) (0.187)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.113 0.335 0.102 0.296 −0.079
(0.107) (0.209) (0.099) (0.282) (0.181)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 1.062∗∗ −4.048∗ 1.497∗∗ 0.856 6.307∗∗
(0.437) (2.099) (0.595) (0.682) (2.352)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.859∗∗ 2.409 −0.886∗∗ −1.318 −4.214∗
(0.343) (1.501) (0.398) (0.992) (2.157)
Problems −2.859∗∗ −2.950∗∗ −3.096∗∗ −2.807∗∗ −3.331∗∗
(0.242) (0.467) (0.314) (0.308) (0.564)
Muslim Population % 1.079 2.714 1.959∗∗ 0.448 5.542∗∗
(0.672) (2.076) (0.788) (0.702) (2.148)
Level of Democracy 0.127∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.301∗∗
(0.035) (0.070) (0.037) (0.046) (0.104)
Change in Democracy 0.074∗ −0.140 0.126∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.045
(0.041) (0.126) (0.044) (0.042) (0.154)
Infant Mortality Rate −0.441 0.881 −0.906∗∗ −0.850∗∗ 0.697
(0.356) (0.668) (0.336) (0.296) (0.838)
First Multiparty Election 0.445 1.775 0.585 0.671∗ 0.680
(0.400) (1.118) (0.486) (0.389) (2.156)
Transitional Election −0.024 0.385 −0.064 0.223 −3.760∗∗
(0.492) (1.129) (0.421) (0.597) (1.805)
Post-Conflict Election 0.239 −0.463 0.746 −0.007 −0.056
(0.455) (0.916) (0.574) (0.556) (1.184)
Pre-Election Violence 0.048 −0.200 0.123 0.134 −0.042
(0.125) (0.424) (0.115) (0.164) (0.243)
Oil Production −0.097 −0.136 −0.153∗ −0.133 −0.019
(0.078) (0.148) (0.090) (0.089) (0.174)
Total Trade 0.004 0.255∗ 0.036 0.008 −0.002
(0.131) (0.143) (0.144) (0.180) (0.191)
Former Colony 0.732 1.194 0.319 0.811 0.905
(0.478) (1.013) (0.502) (0.498) (1.041)
Post-Coup Election 0.530 1.811 −0.546 0.501 −3.234
(0.907) (1.169) (0.911) (1.179) (3.217)
Total GDP 0.160 −0.146 0.271 0.136 0.575
(0.209) (0.333) (0.241) (0.249) (0.567)
Legislative Election 0.535∗ 0.869 0.350 0.447 0.328
(0.304) (0.956) (0.311) (0.424) (0.442)
Cut 1 −4.008 −4.672 −3.220 −6.200 9.908
(4.649) (8.304) (5.162) (5.252) (13.806)
Cut 2 −2.062 −2.330 −1.145 −4.105 11.973
(4.651) (8.330) (5.158) (5.269) (13.864)
N 511 140 371 354 157
Log-Likelihood −291.163 −52.161 −218.125 −183.928 −94.507
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
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Table A.6: Differences Between Western and Non-Western Monitors are Statistically Signif-
icant
OLS Logit Ord. Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.192 −1.675∗ −1.608
(0.125) (1.006) (1.272)
× Western Monitors 0.086 0.707 1.113
(0.149) (1.135) (1.314)
Islamist Terrorism −0.041 −0.534 −0.426
(0.059) (0.437) (0.422)
× Western Monitors 0.002 0.320 0.266
(0.060) (0.438) (0.414)
Non-Islamist Terrorism −0.017 −0.119 −0.139
(0.019) (0.140) (0.140)
× Western Monitors 0.041∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.275∗∗
(0.018) (0.121) (0.118)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.124 −1.167 −1.395
(0.267) (1.115) (1.359)
×Western Monitors 0.345 2.854∗∗ 2.666∗
(0.297) (1.249) (1.478)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.095 1.034 1.084
(0.131) (0.672) (0.911)
× Western Monitors −0.239∗ −2.191∗∗ −1.981∗∗
(0.122) (0.740) (0.909)
Problems −0.316∗∗ −2.482∗∗ −2.842∗∗
(0.030) (0.262) (0.239)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 511 511 511
R2 0.416
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.7: Differences Between Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 Eras are Statistically Significant
OLS Logit Ord. Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.117 −0.864 −0.582
(0.094) (0.691) (0.711)
× Post-9/11 Era 0.360 1.629 2.117
(0.259) (1.568) (1.335)
Islamist Terrorism −0.029 −0.236 −0.173
(0.037) (0.425) (0.408)
× Post-9/11 Era −0.017 −0.080 −0.012
(0.047) (0.503) (0.436)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.050 0.285 0.280
(0.032) (0.278) (0.275)
× Post-9/11 Era −0.058 −0.300 −0.223
(0.040) (0.299) (0.279)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.161∗∗ 1.303∗∗ 0.792
(0.070) (0.602) (0.628)
× Post-9/11 Era 0.291∗ 1.547 1.950∗
(0.163) (1.108) (1.036)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.138 −1.023 −1.278
(0.124) (1.573) (1.111)
× Post-9/11 Era −0.237 −1.235 −1.166
(0.212) (1.878) (1.406)
Problems −0.331∗∗ −2.473∗∗ −2.812∗∗
(0.028) (0.259) (0.243)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 511 511 511
R2 0.410
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.8: Sample of Countries Where Muslim Population > 30%
Terrorism in Last Terrorism in Last
1 Year 5 Years
OLS OLS Logit Ord. Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.009 −0.000 −0.588 1.540
(0.122) (0.129) (1.189) (1.196)
Islamist Terrorism 0.109 −0.025 −0.718∗∗ −0.671∗∗
(0.070) (0.039) (0.352) (0.335)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.008 −0.032 −0.127 1.020∗∗
(0.055) (0.035) (0.295) (0.472)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.041 0.122∗∗ 2.261∗∗ 1.704∗∗
(0.124) (0.053) (0.703) (0.625)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.193∗ −0.132∗∗ −1.835∗∗ −2.353∗∗
(0.097) (0.035) (0.573) (0.567)
Problems −0.338∗∗ −0.344∗∗ −2.979∗∗ −3.802∗∗
(0.046) (0.042) (0.814) (1.034)
Muslim Population % 0.113 0.496∗∗ 6.298∗∗ 2.281
(0.191) (0.221) (2.466) (2.801)
Level of Democracy 0.021∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.372∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.104) (0.099)
Change in Democracy 0.016 0.006 0.295∗ 0.149
(0.011) (0.012) (0.160) (0.138)
Infant Mortality Rate 0.097 0.180 2.614∗∗ 3.238∗∗
(0.148) (0.155) (1.047) (1.301)
First Multiparty Election −0.175 −0.118 −0.946 −1.885∗∗
(0.176) (0.098) (1.117) (0.629)
Transitional Election −0.071 −0.319∗ −5.295∗∗ −3.393∗∗
(0.187) (0.160) (1.291) (1.374)
Post-Conflict Election 0.187 0.314∗ 0.039 0.053
(0.160) (0.154) (1.060) (1.117)
Pre-Election Violence 0.015 0.044 −0.578 −0.720
(0.030) (0.038) (0.490) (0.493)
Oil Production −0.034∗∗ −0.015 0.146 0.282
(0.016) (0.018) (0.148) (0.182)
Total Trade 0.109 0.191∗ 0.455 0.111
(0.094) (0.102) (0.972) (0.858)
Former Colony −0.184 −0.279 −1.160 −1.039
(0.129) (0.180) (0.996) (1.006)
Post-Coup Election 0.437 0.490∗∗ 1.583 2.030
(0.265) (0.196) (1.631) (1.377)
Total GDP −0.047 −0.095 0.498 0.081
(0.081) (0.089) (0.938) (0.826)
Legislative Election −0.085 0.015 0.221 0.530
(0.107) (0.052) (0.337) (0.345)
Constant 1.102 0.862 −22.523
(1.124) (1.522) (15.876)
Cut 1 8.756
(13.807)
Cut 2 11.049
(13.785)
N 108 99 99 99
Log-Likelihood −34.941 −57.038
R2 0.444 0.495
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
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Table A.9: Sample of Competitive Elections
OLS Logit Ord. Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.084 −0.780 −0.750
(0.094) (0.598) (0.676)
Islamist Terrorism −0.041 −0.284 −0.219
(0.026) (0.218) (0.153)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.026∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.014) (0.086) (0.087)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.208∗∗ 1.366∗∗ 1.401∗∗
(0.077) (0.693) (0.632)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.170∗∗ −1.196∗∗ −1.242∗∗
(0.067) (0.543) (0.532)
Problems −0.347∗∗ −2.719∗∗ −3.039∗∗
(0.028) (0.275) (0.260)
Muslim Population % 0.128 1.318∗ 1.172∗
(0.101) (0.758) (0.684)
Level of Democracy 0.015∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.095∗∗
(0.006) (0.039) (0.034)
Change in Democracy 0.011∗ 0.096∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.006) (0.050) (0.043)
Infant Mortality Rate −0.025 −0.239 −0.298
(0.048) (0.378) (0.369)
First Multiparty Election 0.056 0.536 0.315
(0.055) (0.423) (0.395)
Transitional Election −0.009 −0.015 0.133
(0.062) (0.556) (0.524)
Post-Conflict Election 0.005 0.012 0.022
(0.075) (0.516) (0.482)
Pre-Election Violence 0.007 0.033 −0.001
(0.017) (0.133) (0.129)
Oil Production −0.018∗ −0.161∗ −0.148∗
(0.010) (0.083) (0.088)
Total Trade −0.003 −0.035 −0.046
(0.010) (0.179) (0.175)
Former Colony 0.063 0.536 0.597
(0.079) (0.577) (0.565)
Post-Coup Election 0.119 1.123∗ 1.131∗
(0.083) (0.632) (0.659)
Total GDP 0.028 0.323 0.333
(0.028) (0.262) (0.258)
Legislative Election 0.092∗∗ 0.645∗ 0.501∗
(0.046) (0.330) (0.296)
Constant 0.499 −1.950
(0.660) (5.615)
Cut 1 −0.707
(5.475)
Cut 2 1.209
(5.489)
N 486 486 486
R2 0.406
Log-Likelihood −188.757 −271.669
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
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Table A.10: Exclude Extreme Values of Terrorism
Drop observation with Drop observations with
max killing by Islamists 100+ killings by Islamists
(1) (2)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.095 −0.080
(0.083) (0.082)
Islamic Terrorism −0.030 0.004
(0.032) (0.029)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.013 0.015
(0.015) (0.015)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.174∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.134∗∗ −0.134∗∗
(0.055) (0.055)
Problems −0.337∗∗ −0.334∗∗
(0.028) (0.029)
N 510 508
R2 0.401 0.400
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.11: Excluding Incumbents Hostile to the US from Analysis of Western Monitors
Excl. targets of Excl. countries that
US sanctions vote unlike US at UN
OLS OLS
(1) (2)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.349∗∗ −0.154
(0.115) (0.252)
Islamist Terrorism −0.041 −0.097∗∗
(0.036) (0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.003 0.042∗∗
(0.026) (0.020)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.245∗∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.075) (0.067)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.046 −0.228
(0.073) (0.183)
Problems −0.369∗∗ −0.323∗∗
(0.045) (0.044)
Muslim Population % 0.419∗∗ 0.274
(0.130) (0.240)
Level of Democracy 0.016∗∗ 0.006
(0.008) (0.010)
Change in Democracy 0.026∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.008) (0.011)
Infant Mortality Rate −0.085 −0.165∗∗
(0.057) (0.053)
First Multiparty Election 0.120∗ 0.168∗∗
(0.065) (0.067)
Transitional Election 0.041 0.060
(0.073) (0.101)
Post-Conflict Election 0.102 0.351∗∗
(0.108) (0.118)
Pre-Election Violence 0.011 0.021
(0.024) (0.024)
Oil Production −0.024∗ −0.036∗∗
(0.014) (0.016)
Total Trade 0.008 0.038
(0.017) (0.024)
Former Colony 0.049 0.140
(0.095) (0.123)
Post-Coup Election −0.531∗∗ −
(0.151)
Total GDP 0.038 0.025
(0.038) (0.044)
Legislative Election 0.068 0.018
(0.061) (0.077)
Constant 0.374 0.709
(0.902) (0.957)
N 280 194
R2 0.427 0.482
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
In model 2 Post-Coup Election drops due to collinearity.
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Table A.12: Additional Indicators of Western Donor Interest: Aid from OECD DAC and
Voting Similarity with the US at the UNGA
Only Western Monitors
Whole Period Pre-9/11 Post-9/11 Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Problems −0.357∗∗ −0.319∗∗ −0.422∗∗ −0.349∗∗
(0.037) (0.045) (0.078) (0.039)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.225∗∗ −0.207 −0.030 −0.299∗∗
(0.110) (0.134) (0.337) (0.116)
× Post-9/11 Era 0.752∗∗
(0.193)
Islamist Terrorism −0.046 −0.006 −0.076∗ −0.042
(0.028) (0.036) (0.038) (0.032)
× Post-9/11 Era 0.002
(0.044)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.011 0.046 −0.031 0.050
(0.016) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031)
× Post-9/11 Era −0.078∗∗
(0.039)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.281∗∗ 0.210∗ 0.746∗∗ 0.287∗∗
(0.081) (0.110) (0.321) (0.110)
× Post-9/11 Era 0.379∗∗
(0.167)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.150∗∗ −0.137 −0.502∗∗ −0.103
(0.073) (0.118) (0.205) (0.099)
× Post-9/11 Era −0.460∗∗
(0.143)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 361 254 107 361
R2 0.451 0.499 0.525 0.467
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged
oil production, total trade, total GDP, aid from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors
and voting similarity with the US at the UN General Assembly.
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Table A.13: Include Monitor Fixed Effects
OLS
(1)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.114
(0.087)
Islamist Terrorism −0.033
(0.026)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.015
(0.013)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.158∗∗
(0.068)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.123∗∗
(0.057)
Problems −0.323∗∗
(0.034)
Muslim Population % 0.266∗∗
(0.108)
Level of Democracy 0.017∗∗
(0.005)
Change in Democracy 0.014∗∗
(0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate −0.112∗∗
(0.049)
First Multiparty Election 0.090
(0.059)
Transitional Election 0.032
(0.054)
Post-Conflict Election 0.083
(0.075)
Pre-Election Violence 0.014
(0.016)
Oil Production −0.013
(0.009)
Total Trade 0.010
(0.012)
Former Colony 0.020
(0.073)
Post-Coup Election 0.047
(0.091)
Total GDP 0.004
(0.023)
Legislative Election 0.084∗
(0.045)
Constant 1.061∗
(0.557)
N 511
R2 0.454
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
31
Table A.14: Exclude SADC, CIS and the Commonwealth
Exclude Exclude Exclude Exclude
SADC Commonwealth CIS missions w/
missions missions missions any of the 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Problems −0.336∗∗ −0.343∗∗ −0.336∗∗ −0.343∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.136 −0.016 −0.087 −0.051
(0.087) (0.100) (0.084) (0.099)
Islamist Terrorism −0.039 −0.037 −0.039 −0.038
(0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.185∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.182∗∗
(0.061) (0.072) (0.065) (0.066)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.127∗∗ −0.174∗∗ −0.138∗∗ −0.170∗∗
(0.053) (0.063) (0.056) (0.059)
N 501 470 497 446
R2 0.405 0.406 0.403 0.410
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
In column 4, any mission sent by SADC, CIS or the Commonwealth is excluded from the sample.
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity),
change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator,
post-civil war election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator,
country’s logged oil production, total trade, total GDP, and post-coup election indicator.
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Table A.15: Heckman Analyses
All Monitors Non-Western Org’s Western Org’s
Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.083 0.152 −0.141 0.539∗ −0.142 0.048
(0.088) (0.191) (0.120) (0.304) (0.107) (0.181)
Islamist Terrorism −0.032 0.033 −0.032 0.013 −0.040 0.044
(0.034) (0.055) (0.054) (0.083) (0.033) (0.059)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.020 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.025 0.020
(0.016) (0.047) (0.018) (0.056) (0.016) (0.054)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.209∗∗ 0.176 −0.263 0.240 0.312∗∗ 0.151
(0.079) (0.125) (0.435) (0.158) (0.115) (0.131)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.136∗∗ −0.027 0.166 −0.032 −0.159∗ −0.045
(0.063) (0.095) (0.266) (0.110) (0.096) (0.105)
Problems −0.336∗∗ − −0.226∗∗ − −0.352∗∗ −
(0.028) (0.043) (0.035)
Muslim Population % 0.062 −0.496∗∗ 0.167 −1.251∗∗ 0.246∗∗ −0.223
(0.109) (0.237) (0.152) (0.329) (0.117) (0.261)
Oil Production −0.010 0.021 −0.008 0.001 −0.019∗ 0.028
(0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.020)
Level of Democracy 0.020∗∗ 0.001 0.025∗∗ 0.007 0.018∗∗ 0.001
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012)
Change in Democracy 0.015∗∗ 0.026∗∗ −0.010 0.029∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014)
Infant Mortality −0.032 0.151∗∗ 0.100 0.396∗∗ −0.098∗∗ 0.074
(0.052) (0.063) (0.070) (0.101) (0.050) (0.071)
First Multiparty Election 0.056 0.019 0.101 −0.367∗∗ 0.122∗ 0.131
(0.056) (0.108) (0.112) (0.129) (0.069) (0.128)
Transitional Election −0.018 −0.041 −0.049 −0.112 0.009 0.033
(0.057) (0.167) (0.061) (0.169) (0.062) (0.194)
Post-Conflict Election 0.060 0.127 −0.012 0.134 0.139 0.146
(0.072) (0.100) (0.084) (0.103) (0.094) (0.127)
Pre-Election Violence 0.027 0.090∗∗ 0.001 0.068 0.030 0.101∗∗
(0.018) (0.030) (0.042) (0.043) (0.019) (0.036)
Total Trade 0.000 −0.003 0.007 −0.047∗∗ 0.019 0.044
(0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.039)
Colony Indicator 0.022 −0.399∗∗ 0.053 −0.004 −0.044 −0.617∗∗
(0.082) (0.104) (0.068) (0.136) (0.111) (0.111)
Post-Coup Election 0.038 −0.202 0.133∗ 0.235 −0.358 −0.501∗∗
(0.102) (0.164) (0.078) (0.235) (0.261) (0.234)
Total GDP 0.001 −0.066 −0.022 0.028 0.008 −0.128∗∗
(0.026) (0.043) (0.029) (0.053) (0.032) (0.054)
Legislative Election 0.108∗∗ 0.074 0.168∗ 0.185∗ 0.075 0.045
(0.046) (0.064) (0.100) (0.095) (0.048) (0.071)
Global Election Count −0.014∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 0.664 −0.265 0.529 −3.221∗∗ 0.622 1.118
(0.662) (1.065) (0.829) (1.387) (0.698) (1.220)
ρ 0.485∗∗ 0.536∗∗ 0.454
(0.205) (0.228) (0.315)
N 12276 5018 7258
Log-Likelihood -2230.961 -605.824 -1515.490
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
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Table A.16: Cluster Standard Errors by Election
All Countries Non-Western Western Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Monitors Monitors Era Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Problems −0.336∗∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.354∗∗ −0.312∗∗ −0.341∗∗
(0.025) (0.046) (0.031) (0.032) (0.042)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.096 −0.215 −0.138 −0.056 0.070
(0.105) (0.205) (0.129) (0.119) (0.299)
Islamist Terrorism −0.038 −0.037 −0.047 −0.016 −0.049
(0.028) (0.058) (0.029) (0.043) (0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.015 0.013 0.020 0.042∗ −0.010
(0.020) (0.035) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.182∗∗ −0.309 0.289∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.684∗∗
(0.066) (0.480) (0.101) (0.077) (0.234)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.135∗∗ 0.178 −0.154∗ −0.121 −0.476∗∗
(0.052) (0.348) (0.087) (0.115) (0.200)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 511 140 371 354 157
R2 0.402 0.356 0.444 0.418 0.431
Election-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity),
change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war
election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator,
country’s logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.17: Randomly Select 1 Western and 1 Non-Western Observer per Election
All Countries Country Non-Western Western Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Fixed-Effects Monitors Monitors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Problems −0.317∗∗ −0.286∗∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.355∗∗ −0.311∗∗ −0.306∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.052) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.166∗ −0.099 −0.230 −0.163 −0.147 0.330
(0.087) (0.127) (0.147) (0.104) (0.108) (0.236)
Islamic Terrorism −0.034 −0.032 −0.031 −0.046∗∗ −0.035 −0.034
(0.021) (0.023) (0.061) (0.022) (0.041) (0.032)
Non-Islamist Terrorism −0.001 0.047∗∗ 0.008 −0.003 0.034 −0.026
(0.015) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.033) (0.026)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.230∗∗ 0.196∗ −0.160 0.316∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 1.076∗∗
(0.102) (0.101) (0.503) (0.151) (0.090) (0.259)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.200∗∗ −0.269∗∗ −0.003 −0.167 −0.146 −0.933∗∗
(0.082) (0.106) (0.330) (0.121) (0.146) (0.205)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 324 324 116 208 230 94
R2 0.426 0.313 0.363 0.484 0.435 0.494
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity),
change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war
election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator,
country’s logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.18: All Observations Post-1984 (Except Pakistan 1990)
Whole Non-Western Western Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Sample Monitors Monitors Era Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Problems −0.326∗∗ −0.226∗∗ −0.337∗∗ −0.299∗∗ −0.341∗∗
(0.028) (0.045) (0.036) (0.035) (0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.083 −0.183∗∗ −0.117 −0.050 0.070
(0.076) (0.082) (0.103) (0.081) (0.320)
Islamist Terrorism −0.038 −0.035 −0.045 −0.017 −0.049
(0.027) (0.057) (0.027) (0.037) (0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.017 0.014 0.022 0.047 −0.010
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.030) (0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.109∗ −0.297 0.186∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.684∗∗
(0.058) (0.429) (0.080) (0.056) (0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.078∗ 0.159 −0.088∗ −0.054 −0.476∗∗
(0.042) (0.258) (0.046) (0.043) (0.223)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 541 145 396 384 157
R2 0.402 0.355 0.436 0.419 0.431
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.19: Alternative Measure of Islamic Opposition from the Database of Political Insti-
tutions
OLS
(1)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.190
(0.152)
Islamist Terrorism −0.036
(0.023)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.011
(0.015)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.131∗∗
(0.057)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.061
(0.095)
Problems −0.336∗∗
(0.029)
Muslim Population % 0.066
(0.097)
Level of Democracy 0.019∗∗
(0.006)
Change in Democracy 0.011∗
(0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate −0.051
(0.049)
First Multiparty Election 0.062
(0.056)
Transitional Election −0.024
(0.057)
Post-Conflict Election 0.037
(0.072)
Pre-Election Violence 0.017
(0.017)
Oil Production −0.010
(0.010)
Total Trade −0.001
(0.010)
Former Colony 0.080
(0.073)
Post-Coup Election 0.071
(0.100)
Total GDP 0.006
(0.026)
Legislative Election 0.092∗
(0.047)
Constant 1.017
(0.616)
N 511
R2 0.398
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.0537
Table A.20: Test of the Linear Interaction Effect Assumption
OLS Logit
(1) (2)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.091 −0.572
(0.095) (0.651)
Islamist Terrorism (Low) −0.035 −0.418
(0.067) (0.621)
Islamist Terrorism (High) −0.487∗∗ −4.206∗∗
(0.075) (0.962)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (Low) −0.008 −0.173
(0.050) (0.340)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (High) 0.139∗ 1.045∗∗
(0.074) (0.506)
Islamist Terrorism (Low) × Islamic Opposition 0.354∗∗ 2.955∗∗
(0.126) (1.203)
Islamist Terrorism (High) × Islamic Opposition 0.621∗∗ 6.644∗∗
(0.196) (2.164)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (Low) × Islamic Opposition −0.128 −0.970
(0.189) (1.316)
Non-Islamist Terrorism (High) × Islamic Opposition −0.430∗∗ −4.021∗∗
(0.149) (1.145)
Problems −0.335∗∗ −2.563∗∗
(0.029) (0.267)
Controls Yes Yes
N 511 511
R2 0.407
Log-Likelihood -201.466
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage,
level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party
election indicator, transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup
election indicator, pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator,
country’s logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.21: Marginal Effect of Islamic Opposition Based on Table A.20 Model 1 (OLS)
Level of Islamist Terrorism Marginal Effect 90% Confidence Interval
None -0.09 [-0.25, 0.07]
Low 0.29 [0.05, 0.47]
High 0.52 [0.16, 0.90]
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Table A.22: Marginal Effect of Islamic Opposition Based on Table A.20 Model 2 (Logit)
Level of Islamist Terrorism Marginal Effect 90% Confidence Interval
None -0.07 [-0.22, 0.07]
Low 0.25 [0.09, 0.42]
High 0.71 [0.44, 0.98]
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Table A.23: Studying Differences Between IGO and NGO Monitors
Only IGO Only NGO IGO Western
Monitors Monitors Interaction Monitors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.164∗ −0.039 0.018 −0.038
(0.088) (0.131) (0.118) (0.152)
Islamist Terrorism 0.004 −0.065 −0.045 −0.066∗∗
(0.035) (0.040) (0.045) (0.030)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.033
(0.017) (0.056) (0.062) (0.045)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.156∗ 0.237 0.094 0.545∗
(0.082) (0.268) (0.297) (0.324)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.084 −0.235 −0.134 −0.262
(0.067) (0.201) (0.228) (0.277)
IGO Indicator 0.107∗∗ 0.059
(0.048) (0.051)
IGO × Islamist Terrorism 0.034 0.047
(0.052) (0.059)
IGO × Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.001 −0.014
(0.063) (0.048)
IGO × Islamic Opposition −0.236∗ −0.340∗
(0.125) (0.203)
IGO × Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.102 −0.291
(0.348) (0.389)
IGO × Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.025 0.176
(0.262) (0.318)
Problems −0.343∗∗ −0.292∗∗ −0.328∗∗ −0.351∗∗
(0.026) (0.050) (0.028) (0.036)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 340 171 511 371
R2 0.428 0.407 0.415 0.452
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
All regressions include the following control variables: Muslim population percentage, level of democracy
(Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate, first multi-party election indicator,
transitional election indicator, post-civil war, election indicator, post-coup election indicator,
pre-election violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged
oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.24: Extend Analysis to 2012 Using NELDA, GTD and DPI datasets
Terrorism in Terrorism in
Last 1 Year Last 5 Years
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS-FE OLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Islamic Opposition=1 −0.0597 −0.283 −0.173∗∗ −0.495∗ −0.645∗∗ −0.724∗∗
(0.119) (0.211) (0.0728) (0.265) (0.140) (0.142)
Islamist Terror 0.0265 −0.00547 0.0303∗ 0.00596 −0.0422 −0.0123
(0.0277) (0.0358) (0.0179) (0.0197) (0.0296) (0.0401)
Non-Islamist Terror 0.0403∗∗ 0.0257 0.0288∗∗ 0.0315∗∗ 0.0288∗∗ 0.0193
(0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0137) (0.0140)
Islamic Opposition=1 × Islamist Terror −0.0658 −0.0111 −0.145∗∗ −0.133∗ −0.0970∗ 0.0740
(0.0427) (0.0447) (0.0440) (0.0731) (0.0495) (0.328)
Islamic Opposition=1 × Non-Islamist Terror 0.0401 0.0356 0.102∗∗ 0.146 0.189∗∗ 0.120
(0.0537) (0.0883) (0.0501) (0.105) (0.0510) (0.166)
Post-9/11 −0.0402
(0.0440)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11 −2.471∗∗
(0.431)
Post-9/11 × Islamist Terror −0.0548
(0.0349)
Post-9/11 × Non-Islamist Terror 0.0253
(0.0187)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11 × Islamist Terror −2.518∗∗
(0.561)
Islamic Opposition × Post-9/11 × Non-Islamist Terror 2.946∗∗
(0.500)
Controls N Y N Y Y Y
N 827 693 782 693 693 693
R2 0.03 0.38 0.05 0.39 0.15 0.16
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
Controls include the Problems Index, Muslim population percentage, level of democracy (Polity), change in level of democracy, infant mortality rate,
first multi-party election indicator, post-civil war election indicator, post-coup election indicator, pre-election
violence indicator, legislative election indicator, former colony indicator, country’s logged oil production, total trade and total GDP.
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Table A.25: Table 1 with All Controls Displayed
All Countries Country Non-Western Western Pre-9/11 Post-9/11
Fixed-Effects Monitors Monitors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Problems −0.336∗∗ −0.273∗∗ −0.225∗∗ −0.354∗∗ −0.312∗∗ −0.341∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.046) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.096 −0.179 −0.215∗∗ −0.138 −0.056 0.070
(0.083) (0.137) (0.107) (0.110) (0.095) (0.320)
Islamist Terrorism −0.038 −0.031 −0.037 −0.047∗ −0.016 −0.049
(0.027) (0.027) (0.057) (0.027) (0.039) (0.033)
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.020 0.042 −0.010
(0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.031) (0.023)
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 0.182∗∗ 0.173∗ −0.309 0.289∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.684∗∗
(0.065) (0.098) (0.466) (0.101) (0.070) (0.273)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −0.135∗∗ −0.140 0.178 −0.154∗ −0.121 −0.476∗∗
(0.056) (0.091) (0.285) (0.089) (0.126) (0.223)
Muslim Population % 0.129 − 0.362∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.030 0.392
(0.101) (0.136) (0.121) (0.110) (0.256)
Level of Democracy 0.019∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Change in Democracy 0.011∗ 0.012∗ −0.015∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.009 0.017
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.017)
Infant Mortality Rate −0.052 0.277 0.044 −0.106∗∗ −0.088∗∗ 0.034
(0.049) (0.240) (0.070) (0.049) (0.039) (0.120)
First Multiparty Election 0.058 0.007 0.172 0.104 0.083 −0.365
(0.056) (0.074) (0.103) (0.068) (0.054) (0.256)
Transitional Election −0.007 0.065 −0.039 0.009 −0.012 −0.245
(0.064) (0.110) (0.062) (0.074) (0.058) (0.226)
Post-Conflict Election 0.045 0.125 −0.029 0.120 0.017 0.097
(0.071) (0.079) (0.091) (0.092) (0.084) (0.124)
Pre-Election Violence 0.015 0.044∗ −0.008 0.018 0.028 −0.020
(0.018) (0.027) (0.044) (0.016) (0.021) (0.038)
Oil Production −0.013 −0.009 −0.008 −0.022∗ −0.014 −0.011
(0.010) (0.048) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022)
Total Trade 0.000 −0.001 0.014 0.010 0.006 −0.005
(0.010) (0.024) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019)
Former Colony 0.079 − 0.049 0.040 0.109 0.004
(0.074) (0.066) (0.086) (0.072) (0.166)
Post-Coup Election 0.076 0.149 0.098 −0.275 0.103 −0.306
(0.104) (0.125) (0.086) (0.257) (0.119) (0.404)
Total GDP 0.012 0.254 −0.025 0.028 0.006 0.035
(0.026) (0.222) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) (0.075)
Legislative Election 0.095∗∗ 0.020 0.140 0.066 0.064 0.106
(0.047) (0.057) (0.110) (0.047) (0.053) (0.085)
Constant 0.872 −5.905 1.147 0.622 1.086 0.080
(0.627) (5.836) (0.771) (0.694) (0.655) (1.908)
N 511 511 140 371 354 157
R2 0.402 0.239 0.356 0.444 0.418 0.431
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
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Table A.26: Table 2 with All Controls Displayed
Logit Alternative Terrorism in
Estimator Problem Definition Last 5 Years
(7) (8) (9)
Problems −2.525∗∗ −0.137∗∗ −0.337∗∗
(0.261) (0.050) (0.029)
Islamic Opposition Party −0.737 −0.179∗ −0.065
(0.539) (0.107) (0.119
Islamist Terrorism −0.245 −0.024 −0.01
(0.221) (0.043) (0.020
Non-Islamist Terrorism 0.096 −0.002 −0.02
(0.105) (0.018) (0.018
Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition 1.451∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.489) (0.085) (0.031)
Non-Islamist Terrorism × Islamic Opposition −1.077∗∗ −0.121∗ −0.045∗
(0.372) (0.066) (0.025)
Muslim Population % 1.288∗ 0.169 0.136
(0.738) (0.129) (0.110)
Level of Democracy 0.131∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.038) (0.007) (0.006)
Change in Democracy 0.086∗ 0.009 0.010
(0.050) (0.007) (0.006)
Infant Mortality Rate −0.407 −0.014 −0.066
(0.369) (0.054) (0.055)
First Multiparty Election 0.561 0.046 0.099
(0.407) (0.066) (0.065)
Transitional Election −0.051 −0.073 −0.054
(0.540) (0.098) (0.074)
Post-Conflict Election 0.291 −0.001 0.090
(0.492) (0.095) (0.067)
Pre-Election Violence 0.091 −0.031 0.017
(0.133) (0.027) (0.019)
Oil Production −0.121 −0.021 −0.004
(0.076) (0.014) (0.011)
Total Trade 0.014 −0.001 0.001
(0.137) (0.017) (0.012)
Former Colony 0.611 0.015 0.092
(0.508) (0.083) (0.075)
Post-Coup Election 0.486 0.230∗ 0.104
(0.869) (0.128) (0.100)
Total GDP 0.172 0.062∗∗ 0.007
(0.215) (0.030) (0.027)
Legislative Election 0.697∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.112∗∗
(0.326) (0.063) (0.047)
Constant 0.943 −0.852 1.011
(4.836) (0.818) (0.680)
N 511 428 472
Log-Likelihood −203.336
R2 0.241 0.415
Country-clustered robust s.e. in parentheses. ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05
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